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In the early months of the American election year 1980,
there is compelling and growing evidence that the U.S. is
encountering a crisis stage in its global and regional
foreign policy pursuits. Certain trends underway in the
late 1970 's have been galvanized by the Soviet incursion
into Afghanistan, and there is frenetic official and
unofficial activity to try to sort out an appropriate U.S.
response to the newest example of Soviet military and
political aggrandizement. The Soviets' action in
Afghanistan could hardly have come at a more sensitive
time, given the U.S.'s predicament in the Iranian hostage
crisis. These two apparent setbacks in U.S. foreign policy
have triggered increasing criticism, alarm and even
paranoia about the weakness and shiftlessness of U.S.
foreign policy. Yet, while there are many opinions
expressing concern over the allegedly dismal state of our
foreign policy situation, there are too few vigorous and
objective analyses and explanations accounting for where we
are, where we have been, and where we are going.
The newest aggravations and developing hostility
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union give rise to an
urgent necessity that the leaders of this country maintain
firm control over the foreign policy process, identify
clearly national objectives and concerns of U.S. foreign
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policy, and do all within their power to draw together a
new consensus of national purpose and resolve. Two key
elements in such an effort seem strikingly clear. One is
an assessment of our current status in the world at large,
with particular attention being given to the nature of our
relationship with the Soviet Union, and the other is a
fundamental examination of how "we'', the American
body-politic as individuals and as a collective political
animal, constitute a fundamental part of the foreign policy
— domestic politics problems in which we as a nation find
oursleves.
The "we" portion of the foreign policy problem is very
important for aside from being the collective actor in
international affairs, we are the individual actor in
domestic affairs and politics and the receptor-spectator of
what we see or think we know about the world both
domestically and internationally. Given the nature of our
upbringing, education, and experience along with the
values, interests and goals that have accumulated in the
process, we have deep foundations for our perceptions about
the world, and those perceptions are the critical lens
through which we undertake decision making not only as
individuals but as a nation as well. It follows therefore,
that if perceptions are a critical ingredient of foreign
policy making, then in any foreign policy dilemma they are
among the key features deserving examination under as
detached and analytical a frame of mind as possible.
-8-

There seems little doubt that perceptions contribute
significantly to the disarray of our official, and even
academic understanding of today's foreign policy
environment. It seems abundantly clear, however, that the
perception problem is not principally one of analyzing and
gauging the essence, intentions, or drift of the Soviets'
behavior in today's world. Nor is the perception problem
one which tests this country's capacity or sensitivity to
the numerous problems existing here, at home, and/or
abroad. It is much more complicated than either of these
two important concerns, for while it clearly involves those
concerns, it involves the equally essential but more
elusive ingredient of our own perceptions about ourselves
— the spectator, receptor, political actor — in a
complicated and sometimes openly hostile world. These
perceptions, involving our expectations, understanding of
reality, and capacity for self-conscious involvement in
domestic and foreign affairs are subject to error,
miscalculation and even self-deception. We are at once
observers and participants in a world of dramatic and even
spectacular changes where the processes and outcomes should
not be expected to be necessarily beneficial or favorable
to us, but where the inclination, nevertheless, is
unmistakenly bent toward that expectation. vve are a people
of extraordinary complexity and paradox, susceptible to a
self-image which is itself founded in the potential for
misapprehension and distortion by our own perceptions. As
-9-

with all humanity, we can be unwittingly victimized by our
own frailties in defining not only ourselves, but also our
relationship to the rest of humanity and to the world.
In the end, like the rest of humanity, we are patently
susceptible to all the human virtues and vices, but we are
caught through the fortuities of time, place and tne course
of events with the status and role of being a superpower
which we (as a nation) sometimes are ill disposed to
exercise or even occasionally to want. Paradoxically, we
are prone to a self-righteous notion of our own importance
and inherent goodness while recognizing the existence and
potential of the dark side of ourselves — and yet we are
flabbergasted that our good will, intent and good deeds are
not perceived by other nations for what they are ostensibly
intended to be (in this regard, we seem almost congenitally
unable to see the other's point of view.) We are
competitive but not war-mongers; we are challengers of the
status quo of nature but defenders of the notion that
change must be kept orderly and essentially as non-violent
as possible. We are at once the benefactors and the
victims of a heritage of law, convention, and negotiation
as the principal outside arbiters of the competitive urges
and impulses among men, with force of arms and war viewed
as the means of last resort. And yet we are susceptible,
even solicitous of an unencumbered pursuit of
self-interest, individually and as a nation.
As a nation and a people we are utterly, almost
-10-

unbelieveably , complex. Our systems, our upbringing, our
mix of cultures, our education, our multiple self-interests
bend us each to "the courage of our convictions," to our
expression of them, and in the end to the diversity of our
wide and frequently incongruent opinions. In our
contemporary political and social environment, diversity in
motivations for power, identity, and pursuit of special
interest has conspired to promote the often selfish pursuit
of f ractionalized, highly individualized concerns and
interests. The temper of the times and modus operandi of
special interest have tended to neutralize the desire and
the need to found human efforts in the common interest of
the good of the whole (or at least the majority). The
former conventions of compromise and consensus-building
have been relocated to the status of old saws no longer
possible or even desirable. The decline of effective
political power in the two party system has aggravated the
problem of consensus-building and problem-solving, placing
the burden more fully on the shoulders of the
institutionally overburdened legislative and executive
branches of government. Thus, the many problems demanding
attention are perversely affected and complicated both by
the institutionalized problems of the domestic political
structure and by the acutely individualized and fragmented
political environment that makes demands on that structure.
Along with these developments in our domestic political
life have come dramatic changes in the world at large
-11-

particularly over the last ten years. Many of the domestic
trends noted above are becoming world-wide phenomena. The
former simplicity of a bipolar structure tenuously held
together by the threat of assured destruction should the
USSR and U.S. come into open nuclear conflict, has given
way to a more complex international structure. Today's
structure is marked by many new state-actors, state
antagonisms, demands for more equitable distributions of
the world's acquired wealth, and assurances for access to
the promise of better tomorrows. There are old and new
resentments, antagonisms, and open hostilities often
fostered and capitalized upon by religious zealots,
dictators, and acquisitive pov^er seekers intent on not just
having their say but on having their way. They have
exerted a powerful influence in a world where convention
and customs of order have been sacrificed to the will of
their radicalism and demagoguery.
In such a world, the fears, beliefs, and actions of all
of us are susceptible to the construction of defensive
measures for survival and for protecting the self-interest.
Psychologically, the natural inclination is to move toward
greater degrees of certainty through the construction or
acquisition of increased military might. Military power,
presumably, should provide one with the capacity to defend
oneself and one's interests, and to take the quick and
dramatic stances needed to assert one's willingness and
ability to employ it in moments of perceived danger. In
-12-

such instances, the impulse to resort to quick response
postures becomes dramatically more dangerous in tactically
and strategically complex situations. Yet, it is
undeniable that military might and the force of arms is
increasingly being viewed as a prime means of certainty in
an uncertain world.
For a number of analysts the events and patterns of
behavior extant in today's international arena suggest that
the old order is (or already has) broken down and that we
are witnessing a world in transition toward a new
formulation of order in relationships and operating
principles. Among the clearest signposts in the process is
the relative decline in power of the two superpowers and
the growth in influence of Third World nations. In the
conceptualization of the process to this point, analysts
perceive the remnants of the former East-West power
structure as co-existing with an emergent North-South
structure along far more diversified lines. The latter 's
emergence has brought with it a demand for reshuffling
political priorities given the Third World's new and more
urgent agenda of issues and demands. As the power
relationship among nations is reorganized the role of the
superpowers is undergoing considerable redefinition,
altering expectations and demands on them. In such a
world, many of the analysts assert that the old formulas of
power and influence may not have the relevance they once
did, and that new forms and processes of international
-13-

relations need to be devised to permit maintaining some
level of order and for securing and perhaps even furthering
one's traditional self-interests in a changing world.
These are but a few of the salient elements in the
domestic and international environment of 1980 with which
the foreign policy of the U.S. must contend. Clearly, it
is an environment in dynamic flux, yet fundamental
questions need to be addressed concerning the current
state of U.S. foreign policy. First, if U.S. foreign
policy is itself in a state of flux, to what degree does
that fact contribute to an incipient crisis given the
nature and quality of the foreign policy problems facing
this nation? Second, a series of questions needs to be
addressed: What is the nature of the developing situation?
Why has it developed as it has? To what extent are "we" a
part of the problem? What are our perceptions and
priorities, and where do we go and what do we do from here?
The above outline does not begin to address tne
domestic and international ramifications of the problems
currently being encountered in the foreign policy of the
U.S. These ramifications are extraordinarily complex and
difficult to analyze. The need to take account of changes
in multiple internal and external realities, which can take
place mentally very quickly (if not almost simultaneously)
cannot be duplicated in written discourse. To even begin
to deal with these simultaneous features would demand the
comprehensive analysis that only a rather lengthly book
-14-

could provide. Clearly the form of analysis must be
narrowed to a subject or to an area which is susceptible to
detailed examination and to the prospect that it may yield
in the process insight and understanding of the magnitude
of the problems encountered in the development, exposition,
and implementation of U.S. foreign policy. For any of a
number of reasons, the region of southern Africa
constitutes an unusually well suited case for undertaking
such an approach. First, there is sufficient
information regarding foreign policy pronouncements and
interaction with the region to provide the source material
for identifying and evaluating the historical development
of U.S. policy toward the region. Second, global and
regional developments have elevated southern Africa to a
position of greater significance on the agenda of U.S.
foreign policy concerns, particularly over the last five
years. This fact is most significant because it reflects
U.S. concern about the activity of the Soviets and the
Cubans in the region, with the real and perceived issues at
stake in the region's conflict situations, with tangible
U.S. interests not only in the region but elsewhere on the
African continent, and finally with the expressed desire of
the U.S. to exercise an increasingly responsible role in
the resolution of international conflict situations
directly or indirectly affecting tangible and intangible
American interests now and in the future. Third, the
changes wrought in U.S. foreign policy toward southern
-15-

Africa provide an interesting and illuminating example of
how regional policy concerns are affected by the changing
patterns of global priorities in U.S. foreign policy. In
turn, policy statements and behavior toward southern Africa
reflect not only these global priorities, but also the
general perceptions and expectations of this country's
foreign policy elite. This elite — elected leaders,
appointed officials, analysts and interested-others — in
their statements and actions regarding southern Africa
provide revealing examples of their perceptions of the
U.S., their perceptions of the Soviet Union, their
perceptions of world problems and priorities, and their
perceptions of the role the U.S. ought to be exercising in
its relations with the rest of the world. As this analysis
unfolds, one of the primary objectives will be to identify
the way in which changing perceptions in the U.S. regarding
southern Africa are an outcome of changing perceptions of
other global interests and problems. Moreover, a specific
effort will be made to demonstrate the limiting effect
these changes in global concerns and priorities have had on
the relative effectiveness of U.S. policy toward southern
Africa.
The analysis that follows will be divided into two main
parts. The first portion will undertake an historical
review of the principal developments in the conduct of U.S.
foreign policy toward southern Africa in the period of 1954
to 1976. The second portion will undertake a detailed
-16-

examination of the foundations and scope of U.S. foreign
policy toward southern Africa under the Carter
Administration. The examination of the Carter
Administration will first address its philosophical
underpinnings and world view and then proceed to enumerate
the chronological development of its policy in the region.
That chapter will conclude with an analysis of
Soviet-American relations and their influence on the
conduct of the Carter Administration's policy toward
southern Africa. The concluding chapter will be directed
at an analytical evaluation of past U.S. policy in the
region and the seeds of crisis that exist there today given
the incipient reorientation of U.S. global priorities in
the early months of 1980. The enumeration of these factors
and their analysis is designed to identify the nature of
U.S. foreign policy toward southern Africa and to
demonstrate that the convergence of changing global
priorities, the limits to U.S. power and influence, and
persistence of regional problems and a continuing Soviet
threat present a threshold for potential crisis to the U.S.
in the region. U.S. foreign policy, increasingly
responsive to the conservative political drift of the
country, is particularly susceptible to an overreaction in
the event of some new aggressive initiative by the Soviets
and/or Cubans in the region, on the continent, or elsewhere
on the littoral of Africa. Caution and restraint should
mark U.S. policy at a time when regional and global foreign
-17-

policy priorities are in transition and the chances of
miscalculation are so heightened. More significant,
however, is the prospect that the U.S. might revert to its
former attitudes of benign neglect and apathy toward Africa
and its problems.
U.S. inattention to the persistent problems of southern
Africa could quickly reverse the hard-won advances made
over the last three years and could quickly reestablish one
of the important preconditions to increased regional
conflict and hostility in the creation of the same sort of
regional power vacuum that existed prior to the Angolan
Crisis of 1975-76.
The potential for continued and even heightened
conflict in southern Africa suggests that U.S. policy will
need to be continually mindful of the role it can play in
the region as an influential broker for peaceful and
evolutionary change. This thesis will describe how that
role has come about and how that role retains its relevance
today and for the future in U.S. relations with the
volatile region of southern Africa.
-18-

II. UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA
On April 27, 1976/ Secretary of State Henry A, •
Kissinger, announced a "major change in U.S. foreign policy
toward southern Africa" at a luncheon address in Lusaka,
Zambia. The change in foreign policy centered on three
specific countries in the region - Rhodesia, Namibia, and
South Africa. With the new policy, U.S. efforts were to be
directed toward "active diplomatic and economic
intervention to bring about change from white minority to
black majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia, and to
stronger advocacy of expanded black political participation
2
and elimination of apartheid in South Africa." In Lusaka,
Kissinger focussed attention on the regional problems of
racial justice indicating U.S. support for
"self-determination, majority rule, equal rights and human
dignity for all the peoples of southern Africa - in the
name of moral principle, international law and world
peace."
While Secretary Kissinger had emphasized the local
political dimensions of the problem, it was clear to
virtually every observer of the southern Africa scene that
the 'change' in U.S. policy was the direct result of Soviet
and Cuban military involvement in the Angolan civil war of
1975. By April 1976, Soviet and Cuban military involvement.
had proved to be instrumental in the rise to power of the
-19-

Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)
.
Moreover, the continued presence of Soviet advisors and
Cuban forces in Angola, while surely a stabilizing factor
for internal affairs of that nation, presented a potential
and serious destabilizing factor for any future power
struggles in the remainder of the region.
Thus, the redirection of U.S. policy in 1976 brought
together a number of diffuse elements in what has persisted
since that time as the 'problem of southern Africa'. Like
so many international problems in the world today, it
involves a highly complicated set of primary problems and
sub-problems whose coexistence in the region poses
continuing potential for intense political conflict and
increasing violence. The United States' decision of 1976
to exert U.S. influence in the regional and international
resolution of those problems was not only (or simply) a
major change in the U.S. policy toward Africa and its most
volatile sub-region. In addition, the new U.S. decision
represented two further features of U.S. policy relating to
the Soviets. One was that a major effort had been made to
formulate and implement a viable U.S. alternative to the
new and suddenly increased Soviet presence in the region
following its incursion into the Angolan Crisis of
1975-1976. A second feature was that U.S. perceptions of
detente had been revised following Angola and that the new
U.S. policy toward southern Africa marked one form of the
U.S. response to its new estimates of the nature and
-20-

meaning of that concept.
It is significant to point out from the outset that
U.S. foreign policy in southern Africa, involves a much
more complex milieu than involvement in the political
machinations of a remote and volatile region in the world.
Moreover, it is precisely the complexities and
interrelationships of U.S. interests in the region, both in
the short term and long term, which make the policy so
important yet so difficult to undertake effectively. In
this regard, there is a definite sense in which U.S. policy
has been a tedious, if not desperate, effort to balance a
number of competing national interests that are involved
directly or indirectly in the problems of southern Africa.
These interests — social, economic, strategic, political,
and even ideological, — interrelate in U.S. perceptions,
values, interests, and objectives with regard to southern
Africa; and they are at once vulnerable and responsive to
internal and external demands for change.
Indeed, change is a dominant characteristic in U.S.
relations with Africa. Since the mid-1950's the political
nature of Africa has changed dramatically from a colonial
edifice to a continent with fifty-four sovereign states.
As the political realities of Africa have undergone change,
so too have U.S. interests shifted from a modest economic
and political relationship in the 1950 's, to increasing
relations and interdependence with much of the continent by
1980. What is becoming more clear in regard to Africa is
-21-

that which has already become strikingly clear with the
rest of the world: U.S. global interests and relations
with other states and regions of the world are becoming
much more complex. Moreover, increasing degrees of
interdependence and of common interest have tied short term
pursuits of gain to the actual costs and potential benefits
that may be attained in either near or long term futures.
These considerations have begun to weigh more heavily on
policy makers, especially in U.S. relations with the Third
World. While this development is partly the result of new
realities and more sophisticated analysis, an important
stimulus has been the perceived threat of Soviet
competition The Soviet Union, operating in direct and
indirect competition with the U.S., has become a more
viable global superpower whose expansion of power and
influence has added new complexity to U.S. interests and
relations with the Third VJorld. Given the difficult and
complicated nature of superpower rivalry, U.S. policy
makers are compelled to assess at virtually every turn the
limits, nature, and relevance of that competition as a
factor influencing pursuit of U.S. national interests in
the Third World. Such assessments address the strategic,
military, economic, and political implications
of heightened competition (or worse--direct confrontation)
with the Soviets particularly over issues which involve
less than vital interests to either of the protagonists.
Indeed, other interests aside, the most important concerns
-22-

of both superpowers in Third World areas such as Africa
tend to involve one another and the perceived influence or
advantage one may be assuming at the other's expense.
The balancing act of weighing multiple national
interests in a milieu of regional problems and superpower
rivalry lies at the heart of U.S. policy toward southern
Africa. The problems and the policy are extraordinarily
complex; they are very important; and they are quite
dangerous due to the volatile nature of the political
realities in the region, the symbolic and real competitions
of the superpowers, and the intensities of conviction and
potential hostility of the multiple actors involved there.
Southern Africa is a complex web of internal and regional
political strife, competition for rich resources,
protection of economic interests and commitments, vying for
strategic influence and access, and a competitive
battlegound for ascendary of superpower influence on future
realities. The divergent and diffuse interests of the
numerous actors involved there have come to make southern
Africa an increasingly important meeting ground of
competing values, beliefs, interests, and political
aspirations.
This chapter will examine the history of U.S. policy
toward southern Africa in the period from 1954 to 1976.
The analysis will be broken down into the sections: 1)
1954-1968, The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson
Administrations; 2) 1969-1974, The Nixon Administration;
-23-

and 3) 1974-1976, The Ford Administration and a New Policy
toward southern Africa. The purpose of this approach is
threefold: a) to provide an historical account of United
States foreign policy toward southern Africa, b) to examine
the assumptions and political philosophy that underlie U.S.
policy during this period, and c) to examine the influence
which the U.S. -Soviet relationship has exerted on U.S.
perceptions of its role in the region. This analysis will
address the historical setting out of which a renewed U.S.
interest and involvement in the region was engendered in
1975-76, and the development and implementation of a new
foreign policy stance which emerged in the period of
1976-1980, the subject of analysis in the succeeding
chapter
.
A. 1954-1968, THE EISENHOWER, KENNEDY, AND JOHNSON
ADMINISTRATIONS
Mid-twentieth century American interests in Africa had
been confined largely to its military and strategic
importance in World War II and the gradual development of
trade with the European-controlled colonies. In the 1950 's
growing U.S. concern with the incipient nationalism of the
underdeveloped world, its goals of independence, and
America's negative attitudes toward colonialism found
expression in the views of John Foster Dulles. Following a
trip to the Near East and Southern Asia, Dulles, in a
speech to the nation on June 1, 1953, espoused a U.S.
stance on the issue of colonialism that is still a current
-24-

in U.S. political thinking:
Most of the peoples of the Near East and Southern Asia
are deeply concerned about political independence for
themselves and others. They are suspicious of the
colonial powers. The United States too is suspect
because, it is reasoned, our NATO alliances with France
and Britain require us to try to preserve or restore
the old colonial interests of our allies.
I am convinced that United States policy has been
unnecessarily ambiguous in this matter. The leaders of
the countries I visited fully recognize that it would
be a disaster if there were any break between the v
United States and Great Britain and France. They don't
y
want this to happen. However, without breaking from
the framework of western unity, we can pursue our
traditional dedication to political liberty. In
reality, the Western powers can gain, rather than lose,
from an orderly development of self-government.
I emphasize, however, the word "orderly." Let none
forget that the Kremlin uses extreme nationalism to
bait the trap by which it seeks to capture the
dependent peoples. 4
Through 1956, however, European colonialism was the
political reality in Africa (outside of Egypt, Ethiopia,
Liberia, Libya and South Africa), and Europe's colonial
hegemony dominated U.S. perceptions regarding the
continent. Africa seemed to be inexorably linked by
history to the continent of Europe and, as a consequence,
responsibility for colonial internal affairs and the
eventual process of decolonization were considered by the
U.S. to be European colonial problems. Moreover, in a
world where U.S. concerns centered on the bipolar nature of
the cold war and on containment, European control of the
African continent contributed to the perceived bulwark
against communist expansion. While most U.S. congressional
leaders of both parties felt independence was the best way
-25-

to forestall communist penetration in the region, the
perceived nature of African 'political reality' along with
the conservative bent of the Eisenhower Administration
produced the practical effect of an African policy of
"benign noninvolvement . " The policy of the U.S. in the
colonial period, according to Wallerstein, had consisted of
three "essential elements": 1) the priority of world
political alliances, 2) the urging of decolonization on
Europe and 3) the opposing of any political radicalism in
Africa.
In 1956, the process of decolonization in Africa began
to accelerate with the formation of independent states in
Morocco, The Sudan, and Tunisia. 3y the end of 1960, there
were 28 independent states in Africa and U.S. policy was
subject to respond to this new reality in a major shift of
political emphasis. The shift, initiated by the Kennedy
Administration in 1961, involved the formal recognition of
the newly independent states, the establishment of
embassies and diplomatic exchanges, and an effort toward
building a basis for better relationships and understanding
with the new African leaders. The most specific policy
initiative involved the identification of certain
"bellwhether states" for the development of special
relationships and specific economic development
assistance. ^
By 1962 approximately seventy-five percent of the
territory in Africa had achieved independence. Yet, two
-26-

difficulties remained which together would pose a major problem
for future U.S. policy — the continued colonial status of the
remaining portion of Sub-Saharan Africa and the attendant
problems of self-determination and majority rule that were
becoming increasingly important political issues in white
dominated southern Africa. The outline of these problems
was perceivable to some Africa observers in the early
1960 's, but U.S. involvement with Sub-Saharan Africa was
marked by moderation in both political and economic
initiatives. Indeed, economic involvement was the primary
ingredient of the U.S. - African interrelationship. In
this regard, Wallerstein asserts that the U.S. policy had
two objectives: "an expansion of African involvement in
the world economy, and a relative open door for U.S.
investment and trade." U.S. official and private
interests in economic relations with Africa were part of a
broader foreign policy orientation. David L. Buckman
asserts that: "The growing official interest in
stimulating African trade and investment was motivated in
part by idealism and the desire to 'foster economic
development, ' in part by a number of foreign policy
considerations aimed at increasing American influence,
offsetting communist trade and investment initiatives, and
encouraging the creation or continuation of stable
governments." U.S. trade with all of Africa increased
from $1.3 billion in 1960 to over $10 billion by 1974 (5%
of total U.S. trade); while U.S. investments in Africa
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increased from $925 million in 1960 to $4.23 billion in
1974 (2% of total foreign investments in 1960; over 3% in
12
1974). Under the Kennedy administration, U.S. bilateral
economic aid and food programs were accelerated
significantly to a level of $600 million per annum in the
years 1962-63. ^^
U.S. economic aid dwindled through the remainder of the
1960 's and into the early 1970 's as part of a growing
national disenchantment with the prospect of winning
political advantage from foreign aid. By the mid-70 's
Africa's share of the worldwide total of U.S. foreign
economic aid had actually been reduced from about one-fifth
14to one-tenth. Part of the impetus to this development
had originated in the Clay Report (Report of the Special
Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Third World,
1963) which recommended that U.S. bilateral aid to Africa
should be gradually eliminated. Both the Clay Report and
the Korry Report ("Policy for Development in Africa,"
161966) had cautioned U.S. policy makers against the
advisability of promoting military aid programs in Africa
due to the potential wastage of U.S. and African resources
and the prospect that increased interstate tensions and
competitions might develop, setting a precedent for
17
enlarged African military establishments.
U.S. policy on arms transfers to Africa in the period
of 1960-1975 remained remarkably consistent and essentially
very conservative. In that period, the U.S. Military Aid
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Program (MAP) to Africa accounted for less than one percent
of the world total and foreign military sales less than
three percent of U.S. global commitments. The consistency
and limited dimensions of U.S. arms transfers were the
result of two interrelated factors: 1) the regional
ceiling of $40 million established by Congress in the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for military grants, cash,
18
and credit transactions between governments; and 2) the
fact that, typically and generally, African military
establishments and their support requirements had been
organized and sustained through arrangements with the
former colonial metropoles with the result that little
1
9
supplementary assistance from the U.S. was required. The
limited emphasis on military establishments facilitated the
prospect for maintaining the political status quo in the
new and fragile independent states. In this regard, U.S.
policy provided active support of European provisions for
the post-colonial era, and an equilibrium that was to be
severely jolted in 1975 by Soviet activities in southern
Africa.
Under the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, U.S.
involvement in Africa was most dramatic in relation to
crisis events in Zaire (until 1964 the Belgian Congo).
From its independence in 1960 through a mercenary rebellion
in 1967, Zaire experienced repetitive internal turmoil and
20the threat of possible Soviet unilateral intervention.
U.S. policy in these crisis situations was exercised
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through a) the UN with substantial U.S. financial and
logistical support for deploying UN forces to the area
(1960-1961), b) the use of direct logistical support for
transporting Belgian paratroopers to Zaire (1964), and c)
military assistance to the central government of Zaire both
directly and through the intermediary of the Ethiopian
government during the mercenary rebellion (1967). ^-^
While the U.S. was willing, if not eager, to exercise
its prerogatives in influencing events in independent
Africa, its free exercise of power was constrained in
relations with the remaining portion of Africa still under
colonial rule. The continuing deference of U.S. policy to
the influence of Europe in African internal affairs
(especially for former colonies) was reflected in the "five
pillars" concept enunciated by Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs, G. Mennen Williams, in March, 1965.
The "five pillars" for African policy, as sub-elements of a
"worldwide foreign policy of peace, freedom, and
prosperity." ^^vere: 1) U.S. support for
self-determination; 2) encouragement of the solution of
African problems by Africans themselves and support of
their institutions through which solutions could be reached
(e.g., the Organization of African Unity-OAU); 3) support
of improved standards of living through trade and aid; 4)
the discouragement of arms buildups beyond the needs of
internal security or legitimate self-defense; and 5)
encouragement of other countries of the world, particularly
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the former European metropoles, to recognize their
23
continuing responsibilities toward Africa.
For the U.S., the 'five pillars" represented a balance
of positive and negative aspects of policy. The positive
aspect was a balanced formula of prescriptive policy
orientations, which, while recognizing the existence of
substantial problems and complexities in Africa,
nevertheless, addressed "mutual" U.S. and African political
goals and aspirations, economic relations, and
military-security provisions. In this regard, the "five
pillars" revealed a clear concern about the complicating
potential threat of communist "subversion" — "the entry of
Red China into the African Continent, and its competition
with Moscow, have increased and made more complex, rather
than diminished, the total impact of Communist im.perialism
in Africa. "^^ Implicitly, the U.S. was orienting its
policy toward a patient, 'necessarily' gradual, long term
program of assistance and political support for African
desires, aspirations, and choices. In this, the U.S.
policy toward Africa in the 1960 's was a potent
manifestation of the belief in and preference for
evolutionary change. However, the thrust of the policy
from another perspective involved an American ideological
counterweight (premised on freedom of choice for Africans
themselves) to a negative aspect of policy, the perceived
threat of Communist subversion and possible insurgency on
the African continent. Thus, the "five pillars" were a
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complicated admixture premised on evolutionary change and a
significant underlying purpose - limiting the opportunity
for communist advances or interference in the affairs of
the continent. The convergence of these policy intentions,
objectives, beliefs and preferences is evident in Williams'
discussion of the 'five pillars' concept:
In this statement of our African policy fundamentals, I
have not mentioned opposition to, or containment of.
Communism. However, there is no question that the
support of freedom over communism is basic to and a
product of, the aforementioned tenets that guide United
States policy in Africa. From time to time special
measures may be needed to meet crisis situations - and
they will be taken vigorously when necessary - but
conditions in Africa are such that the support of true
African independence and development is, in the long
run, the surest guarantee that Africa will remain in
the world of free choice and keep communism at arm's
length. "25.
By the mid-1960 's, one of the most significant effects
of the decolonization process lay in the increasing power
and influence of Third World nations within the forum of
the United Nations (U.N.). As a consequence, U.S. policy,
especially in Africa, began to encounter the mixed
advantages of having to weigh traditional power interests
against the newly emerging interests of the independent
Black states of Africa. In certain cases, even where U.S.
economic interests were at stake, the U.S. was able to
assess the views of competing groups of African actors and
to choose a course of action reflecting the best political
interest of the U.S. Thus, in 1963, under President
Johnson, the U.S. backed the U.N.Security Council initiation
of an arms embargo against the Republic of South Africa
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(RSA). The implementation guidelines of the new policy
were established at the level of Deputy Assistant Secretary
2 6
of State in January 1964. The operative paragraph stated
that: "Items having distinct nonmilitary utility, but in
no case any arms, ammunition or other items of weapons
nature, may be exported to or sold in SA if ordered by and
27for civilian non-governmental use."
Within southern Africa, the issue of independence for
Northern and Southern Rhodesia rested on the contentious
problem of NIBMAR (No Independence Before Majority African
Rule). In Northern Rhodesia this pre-condition had been
satisfied for the British and the colony achieved
independence taking the name Zambia, on October 24, 1954.
In Southern Rhodesia, white resistence to NIBMAR was
manifest in the Rhodesia Front ( RF ) Party led by Ian Smith.
After several unsuccessful attempts to negotiate a
satisfactory agreement with the British to effect
independence founded on a long-range promise of
transitioning to black majority rule, the RF party
announced a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on
November 11, 1965. The U.S. was quick to follow the
British initiative of declaring the act illegal. U.N.
mandatory economic sanctions were imposed on Rhodesia on
December 16, 1966. U.S. support of these sanctions
included an executive order requiring that 'the last
Rhodesian ore (chrome) that could be exported to the US
under sanctions was that which had, at least, been blasted
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from the mine face before Johnsons 's order [establishing
the sanctions] of 5 January 1967." ^^
In the latter half of the Johnson Administration, U.S.
involvement with Africa was at a low ebb with declining
economic aid and a political dissociation marked by
deference to British, U.N. , and OAU leadership in the affairs
of Africa and especially the region of southern Africa.
U.S. national priorities and energies had shifted
dramatically to the ongoing war effort in Vietnam. Given
the continuing foreign policy concerns of stability in
East-West relations and security in Europe, combined with
the developing problems of dissent and fragmentation in the
domestic policical arena over Vietman, the U.S. was bound
to allow its earlier concerns over Africa to slip to the
status of relative neglect. As Whitacker points out: "The
U.S. indifference was made more comfortable by the
apparently low level of Soviet interest in Africa during
much of this period," though the Soviets "... maintained
a flow of aid to various of the southern African liberation
movements throughout the decade." ^
B. 1969-1974, THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION AND THE NIXON
STRATEGY
The inauguration of President Richard M. Nixon in
January 1969 brought a new establishment of domestic and
international leadership to power in the U.S. Its mandate
in foreign policy was abundantly clear — to extricate the
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U.S. from its military commitment in South East (S.E.)
Asia; its domestic mandate, implied and therefore less
clear — to facilitate a restoration of domestic harmony
and equilibrium following the turbulent years of 1967-1968.
Both tasks were monumental in scope and closely
interrelated. while easing of domestic strife might have
little direct effect on the international predicament,
public sentiment could be relaxed by favorable
breakthroughs in the international arena. Thus, the new
administration would be marked by frequent foreign policy
initiatives and the eventual pronouncement and elaboration
of a new era in international relations. On the homefront,
a return to stability and the status quo would be
encouraged by extolling the merit and necessity of domestic
self-restraints through "law and order." With the power
and authority to do so, Richard Nixon and his
administration were taking the initiative, especially in
foreign affairs.
When Richard Nixon took office, he was determined to
take charge of foreign policy and to reestablish formal
procedures for policy making. ^^ He appointed a long-term,
friend, William P. Rogers, as Secretary of State and Henry
A. Kissinger as his Assistant for National Security
Affairs. At the same time, Nixon undertook to revitalize
the National Security Council (NSC) as a central mechanism
for policy formulation and decision making. With Kissinger




of interagency committees at the Under Secretary level,"
along with several special sub-groups. With the
formulation and manning of the new NSC system complete,
Nixon and Kissinger ordered a sweeping re-evaluation of
foreign policy and national security issues. The resulting
studies were to be very comprehensive, covering a broad
"range of options, rather than agreed positions, on many
32issues." These studies were termed National Security
Study Memoranda (NSSM's) whose evaluations and
recommendations when acted upon were issued by the
President (or later by Kissinger) as a National Security
33
Decision Memorandum (NSDM). An NCS staff of between 45 \
to 55 professional personnel was also organized with duties
involving a wide range of functions from analysis and
reports to superintending "the work of the departments and
34
agencies, ensuring central control on a host of issues."
Given the wide assortment of problems that had faced
the U.S. in early 1969, the Nixon Administration had set
about its tasks with remarkable energy, obvious
^
,
forethought, and considerable organization. The most
significant structural feature to appear in the
administration was the organization and centralization of a
responsive, executive-oriented foreign policy apparatus in
the NSC system. Under the personal tutelage of Kissinger,
such an organization, tasked with the formidable project of
re-evaluating the full range of U.S. foreign policy issues,
interests, and opportunities, was ideally suited to produce
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a number of important new perspectives and new directions
in U.S. international relations. While these would be
forthcoming at a later date, certain other patterns were
emerging or had become objective facts. The most readily
evident was the "taming of the traditional foreign policy
bureaucracy." Both Nixon and Kissinger held a distrust
of the bureaucracy -- Nixon's based on government
experience and his view of its dampening of executive
prerogative;"^ Kissinger on more theoretical, but equally
averse grounds.-" With a relatively inexperienced foreign
policy representative installed as Secretary of State, the
traditional nucleus of executive foreign policy making was
relegated to a secondary, functional position. The mode of
operation for foreign policy making had become the NSC '"^
system and the personal diplomacy effected by the President
and his chief emissary, Henry Kissinger, whose activities
were principally conducted under the shroud of high level,
secret diplomacy.
The earliest policy statements and progress reports of
the administration tended to focus on the efforts to
resolve U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. As these
policy positions evolved, the theme of the discussions,
which centered on South-East Asia (S.E. Asia), became known
as the Nixon Doctrine. That policy, expressed for the
first time in the President's Guam press conference of
November 3, 1969, stressed three guidelines which, taken
together, provided an "essential rationale for
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retrenchment" of U.S. "material and political involvement
in behalf of other states." As such, its essential
thrust involved self-reliance for other states with U.S.
burdens of support being taken up much more selectively
and, then, only in partnership with a state which had
demonstrated its willingness to help itself, first and
foremost.
Robert E. Osgood suggests that the broader and more
"coherent conception of the patterns and modes of
international politics and their relationship to America's
position in the structure of international power" put
forward by Nixon might be more properly called the "Nixon
Strategy." ^^ The basic features of this strategy included:
a) "the achievement of an international order congenial to
American values, an aim that transcends specific tangible
interests in various parts of the world," b) the pursuit
of a "stable structure of relationships" as the basis for
the evolving international order; and c) the pursuit of
40these aims through negotiations and diplomacy.
Nixon's first annual report to the Congress provided a
comprehensive exposition of his views on the "new era of
international relations." That new era would involve "a
new U.S. approach to foreign policy." The postwar period
had ended; the military balance of power had been altered
with both sides recognizing a "vital mutual interest in
halting the dangerous momentum of the nuclear arms race";




been lost. The framework for a durable peace was to be
built on partnership, strength, and a willingness to
43
negotiate. Furthermore, policy needed to be creative,
systematic, based on facts, knowledgeable of alternatives,
44
prepared for crises, and effectively implemented. Thus,
the Nixon Strategy was a formulation of a significantly
altered, if not altogether new, U.S. foreign policy
approach in a world which had undergone dramatic changes in
the post-war era. A fundamental element among those
changes was the increased Soviet strategic and conventional
strength and the consequent alteration it had effected in
the balance of power. As Nixon's foreign policy views
would unfold over time, the importance of secondary orbits
of power such as the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and
the economic and political power of Western Europe (e.g.,
the European Economic Community) and Japan would be added
to his concept of a more fluid and complex arrangement of
the international order. So complete was Nixon's belief in
fundamental changes in the balance of power that
international order was expected to involve a complete
muting of military power relations by some future date (5,
10 or 15 years from 1971) when Nixon expected the world
could witness the emergence of "five great economic
superpowers" whose power would "determine the economic
future and, because economic power will be the key to other
kinds of power, the future of the world in other ways in
45
the last third of the century."
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The predilection of the Nixon administration to view
the "era of negotiation" in terms of an emerging economic
order and a muted traditional power confrontation is a
critical assumption in the Nixon appraisal of Third World
realities, especially that of Africa. Thus, the Nixon
Report of 1970 formalized the administration's dim view of
Africa's problems and future prospects. The report
acknowledged an awareness of the "grave problems" the
continent still faced and the previous lack of a "clear
conception" by America regarding relationships with Africa
and her particular problems. In the report, Nixon asserted
two major concerns for the U.S. "regarding the future of
Africa":
1. That the Continent be free of great power rivalry
or conflict in any form. This is even more in Africa's
interest than in ours.
2. That Africa realize its potential to become a
healthy and prosperous region in the international
community. Such an Africa would not only be a valuable
economic partner for all regions, but would also have a
greater stake in the maintenance of a durable world
peace. 46
The Nixon Report (1970) went on to enumerate three
challenges to the African continent: economic development,
weathering the inevitable strains of nationhood, and the
deep-seated tension in the southern sixth of the Continent.
In regard to the latter region, the report asserted that
the U.S. "stands firmly for the principles of racial
equality and self-determination," yet.
At the same time, the 1960 's have shown all of us -
Africa and her friends alike - that the racial problems
in the southern region of the Continent will not be
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solved quickly. Those tensions are deeply rooted in
the history of the region, and thus in the psychology
of both black and white.
Though we abhor the racial policies of the white
regimes, we cannot agree that progressive change in
Southern Africa is furthered by force. The history of
the area shows all too starkly that violence and the
counterviolence it inevitably provokes will only make
more difficult the task of those on both sides working
for progress on the racial question. ^^
A key point throughout the Nixon years was his view
concerning outside interference, and with regard to it,
Nixon's language was strong and forthright. His statement
was at once a warning and a plea for self restraint in the
actions of other states toward Africa. Its significance
lies in its implied acknowledgement that conditions were
indeed ripe (especially in southern Africa) for such
interference and in the prescriptive notion that the
restraint of the U.S. should be matched by the restraint of
others. As noted earlier, the relative lack of Soviet
activity in Africa in the late 60 's had provided a
favorable circumstance for a parallel U.S. disinterest in
48
the continent. That fact not withstanding, the U.S.
position on noninterference involved a curious blend of
assumptions, prescription, and expectation concerning the
prospects for outside influence upon African problems. As
a guide to actual practice, it was elevated to the status
of a central tenet of U.S. policy regarding Africa:
The United States is firmly committed to
non-interference in the Continent, but Africa's future
depends also on the restraint of other great powers.
No one should seek advantage from Africa's need for
assistance, or from instability. ^^
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The first Nixon Report had tacitly combined the
concepts of self-reliance from the Nixon Doctrine with the
'five pillars' concept of 'leaving Africa's problems to the
resolution of Africans.' In one regard, these were the
reverse side of the non-interference tenet, while in
another regard, they constituted a defense mechanism to the
double approach-avoidance conflict over meddling in the
difficult, intractable problems faced by the Africans. On
the clearly positive side, the U.S. outlook represented in
the first Nixon Report permitted maximum latitude to
Africans (black and white) to resolve their own problems,
and satisfied the desire of most black African leaders to
have the superpowers stay out of their conflicts. In 1970,
the U.S. -African relationship was largely satisfactory (on
the surface) and the Nixon Report had warmly welcomed the
initiative of the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969. That Manifesto
was a declaration by fourteen black African leaders to
pursue a negotiated "peaceful transfer of power, over an
50
undefined period, to African majority rule."
Nixon's second annual report to the Congress in 1971
was a modest reformulation of the main themes contained in
the first, along with a status report on the
accomplishments of the preceding year. The "core" of his
foreign policy was the search for an international
structure based on partnership with the "necessary adjuncts
of strength to secure our interests and negotiations to
reconcile them with the interests of others." The
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relations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. required a
willingness "to practice self-restraint in the pursuit of
52
national interests," and the respect of each for the
53interests of the other.
The discussion of U.S. policy toward Africa was revised
in the second report and organized around the concepts of
peace, development, and justice as goals of Africa's
current political life. U.S. support was directed toward
providing various forms of assistance in attaining those
54goals, "as our resources permit." The report's
discussion of justice included a review of U.S. policy
measures regarding racial and political justice in southern
Africa. For the U.S., "the violence to human dignity
implicit in apartheid" should not be condoned nor could a
"violent solution to these problems." The discussion on
justice concluded with an important statement on the white
regimes of the region: "We do not . . . believe the
isolation of the white regimes serves African interests, or
our own, or that of ultimate justice. A combination of
55
contact and moral pressure serves all three."
These words were of far-reaching importance, for, while
the U.S. remained firmly committed to evolutionary change,
the nature of U.S. policy practices was undergoing a subtle
but significant shift. During the Johnson administration,
policy toward southern Africa had been based on support of
black goals and aspirations, principally through the
combination of moral and economic pressures on the white
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regimes of Rhodesia, South Africa and the Portuguese
territories. By February of 1971, the Nixon administration
had undertaken to apply its influence on these regimes
through a combination of contact and moral pressure.
Contact, as its policy in practice would indicate, involved
a relaxation of the restrictions on arms embargoes and
Export-Import Bank credits to the RSA and Portuguese
territories, and the lifting of economic sanctions on
Rhodesia to facilitate chrome imports to the U.S. Contact
provided a more flexible mechanism for U.S. policy, served
to improve U.S. economic relations in southern Africa (with
the white redoubt), and provided a clear indication that
the white regimes were not to be subjected to further
isolation from the U.S. under the Nixon Administration.
These developments appear to have been the consequence
of a number of interrelated factors. Perhaps the most
basic factor was a fundamental difference in philosophical
and political outlook. The issue of sanctions involves the
practical question of whether 'the carrot or the stick' is
most effective in inducing another political entity to
respond in a desired manner. While the Johnson
administration had indicated its predilection through
endorsing and supporting various UN-initiated economic
restrictions against the white regimes, his successors
evidenced a preference to seek favorable results through
economic inducements and solicitations rather than
sanctions. iMore specifically, however, two events in the
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first year of the Nixon administration provided an impetus
to the relaxation of economic pressure on the white
regimes. The first was the major review of American policy
toward southern Africa ordered on April 10, 1969: NSSM 39
included a review of past and present policy but focussed
on a thorough and extraordinarily rational examination of
56
five options for 'future policy' toward the region. In
spite of some redeeming virtues, NSSM 39 has been assailed
as the quasi-philosophical foundation for a pronounced
negative turn in U.S. policy toward southern Africa,
57generally, under the Nixon and Ford administrations.
According to one analyst, Edgar Lockwood, the
substantive analysis of NSSM 39 misperceived the basic
issues at stake in the minds of black Africans in southern
Africa. The issue was not racial prejudice or
discrimination - its social context - but the more
fundamental political issue of transferring power from the
58
control of white minority regimes to the black majority.
A major part of the analytical difficulty lies in the
premises of Option 2: "The whites are here to stay and the
only way that constructive change can come about is through
59them." There is a broad consensus among analysts that
Option 2 became the implicit, if not explicit, operational
mode for the Nixon administration. As a result, its
'premises', 'posture' and 'operational examples' have
provided a fruitful starting point for analyzing certain of
the outlooks and intentions of those who managed the U.S.
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policy toward Africa in those years. A portion of the
"General Posture" for Option 2 illustrates the point:
We would maintain public opposition to racial
repression but relax political isolation and economic
restrictions on the white states. We would begin by
modest indications of this relaxation, broadening the
scope of our relations and contacts gradually and to
some degree in response to tangible - albeit small and
gradual - moderation of white policies. ... At the
same time we would take diplomatic steps to convince
the black states of the area that their current
liberation and majority rule aspirations in the south
are not attainable by violence and that their only hope
for a peaceful and prosperous future lies in closer
relations with white dominated states. . . This
option accepts, at least over a 3 to 5 year period, the
prospects of unrequited US initiatives toward the
whites and some opposition from the blacks in order to
develop an atmosphere conducive to change in white
attitudes through persuasion and erosion. 60
A number of analyses have demonstrated the lingering
affect of NSSM 39 perspectives on subsequent foreign policy
problems encountered by Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger in
southern Africa. One such analysis by John Marcum
concerning the lessons of Angola points to the NSSM 39 view "^ >
that "African insurgent movements were ineffectual and not
'realistic or supportable' alternatives to continued
colonial rule." Moreover, in regard to the black
insurgency movements and the prospects of their achieving
success the NSSM analysis "questioned 'the depth and
premanence of black resolve' and 'ruled out a black victory
at any stage. "°-'- These perspectives were proven patently
wrong with the abrupt termination of Portuguese control
over the territories of Mozambique and Angola in 1975.^^
Marcum's analysis illustrates not only the perceptual
weaknesses of NSSM 39 but its particular susceptibility to
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being overcome by events in a volatile and potentially
revolutionary environment. More significantly, the
perceptions and expectations of NSSM 39 tended to distort
analysis and acceptance of intelligence reports tnat things
were changing both in Portugal and in the colonies. The
rigidities induced by 'hanging onto the white regimes' and
doubting the prospect for a black resolution until it was a
virtual fait accompli neutralized the prospects for U.S.
policy adaptations and flexibility as events unfolded in
southern Africa,
A second impetus to a relaxation of the economic
pressure on the white regimes originated in the
bureaucracy. In December 1969, Maurice Stans, the
Secretary of Commerce, submitted a memorandum to the
President containing four recommendations for U.S. policy
on economic relations with southern Africa. Stans'
recommendations represented the narrowly defined economic
views of a classic Allisonian Model II bureaucratic
organization. His recommendations, however, closely
paralleled certain of the operating examples that had
appeared in Option 2 of NSSM 39. He urged the easing of
restrictions on export promotion to the Republic of South
Africa (RSA); making all Export-Im.port Bank credit and
facilities, and especially direct credits, available to the
RSA; easing the arms embargo on RSA to a point "no more
restrictive than the norm applied by other major trading
nations adhering to the relevant UN resolutions": and
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modifying the U.S. economic sanctions against Rhodesia to
63
permit imports of chrome ore.
The effort to ease economic restrictions against the^
white regimes of southern Africa in 1969 and 1970 closely
paralleled the prescriptive measures outlined in NSSM 39.
The approach was undertaken incrementally and with care not
to stir overt opposition to economic practices reflecting
political or psychological support for those regimes; NSDM
75, "the 150,000 ton exception," was approved in 1970
permitting Union Carbide to import chrome from Rhodesia.
This action overturned the Johnson policy prohibiting sue
imports as well as the U.N. resolution of December 16, 1966
establishing the selective mandatory sanctions against
Rhodesia. ^^
With these developments as a background, the passage of
the Byrd Amendment seemed all the more astonishing as a
blatant shift away from support for the black movements of
southern Africa. In fact, the Byrd Amendment (introduced
by Senator Harry Byrd, I-VA) was a complex matter that
represented several disparate factors intersecting in an
action that had the appearance of a major reversal and
substantial betrayal to the Black African cause. Since it
was originally drafted as an amendment to the United
Nations Participation Act of 1971, it is evident that its
supporters viewed it, at least in part, as a unilateral
means by which the U.S. could avoid or circumvent the
increasingly strident postures being taken by the U.N. , in
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particular with regard to sanctions in southern Africa.
Secondly, the increasing militancy of U.N. positions had
exceeded the bounds to which the majority of the congress
would go in the application of the 'stick' to Rhodesia.
Thirdly, and most importantly, the supporters of the
amendment had made a clever use of a) lingering cold war
sentiments by suggesting the vulnerabilities of the US to
its increasing dependence on imports of chrome ore from the
USSR, given the sanctions on Rhodesian ore; and b) the
adverse effects that sanctions had caused in the price of
chrome, in the U.S. steel market, in unemployment, and in
depletion of the national chrome ore stockpile.
The administration seems to have been only mildly
opposed to the measure since its opposition was merely
token. Passage of the amendment seems to have been one of
those unique occasions when blatant international costs to
national prestige were accepted in order to facilitate or
to bolster domestic power politics, U.S. sovereignty in
relation to the U.N. , and especially a narrowly defined,
short-term concept of national interest. The amendment,
which ultimately was enacted as a statutory change to the
Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act after
being signed by the President on November 17, 1971,
provided that the president could "not prohibit the
importation of a strategic material from a free world




Passage of the Byrd Amendment by Congress aroused quick
and negative reactions in the U.N. which "expressed grave
concern" over the U.S. prospective violation of Security
Council resolutions, even before the document was signed
The U.S. action was a remarkable departure from the
Kennedy-Johnson years when the U.S. had usually provided
conscientious support to the black African independence
initiatives of U.N. It was a clear reflection of the Nixon
administration's growing irritation over and antipathy for
U.N. politics. The developments of 1971 within the U.N.
General Assembly "afforded a dramatic illustration of the
divergence on policy toward Southern Africa that had
developed between the United States and a majority of U.N.
member nations, particularly those belonging to the
Communist and 'third world' groups. "°'
By comparison with the first two Nixon Reports to
congress, the third report (February 1972) was considerably
more muted in its tone regarding Africa's future and its
"awesome problems" of modernization and the southern Africa
problem. The most striking new proposal was the notion put
forth of a "policy of economic support, political
restraint, and mutual respect." ^ Restraint was
rationalized in regard to southern Africa in the following
statements:
The notion that one nation, however powerful or well-
intentioned, can master the most intractable issues
plaguing foreign societies belongs to a past era. For
our part, we look toward black and white i_n Africa to
play the primary role in working toward progress
consistent with human dignity. Southern Africa
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contains within itself the seeds of change. We can and
will work with others to encourage that process. ^^
The "successes" of the Nixon years in foreign policy
initiatives were the high priority issues of detente, Salt
1, and the rapproachment begun with the PRC. These events
of 1971, and principally of 1972, provided a degree of
confidence that emerges in the fourth Nixon Report. The
discussion is more candid and forthright with regard to
Africa as well. The policy goals of the U.S. remained
"unchanged: political stability, freedom from great power
intervention, and peaceful economic and social
70development." Non-interference in African internal
affairs was still considered a "cardinal principle of
United States policy" and "restraint should characterize
71
great powers conduct."
In his fourth report, Nixon's treatment of the southern
Africa problem exhibited a very new bent - on open
recognition of South Africa as "a dynamic society with an:
72
advanced economy." In a paragraph concerning the U.S.
approach toward RSA, the language is a virtual replica of
elements in NSSM 39:
We have sought to maintain contact with all segments of
South African society. We do not endorse the racial
policies of South Africa's leaders. But we do not
believe that isolating them from the influence of the
rest of the world is an effective way of encouraging
them to follow a course of moderation and to
accommodate change. 73
The history of his administration's difficulties in the
U.N. over Africa and other Third World issues was being
complicated by the emergence of the nonalignment movement
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and its ability as a third power bloc to exert
international pressure on the U.S. or USSR. Nixon's scheme
of "stable structures" was confronted with the new
difficulties and uncertainties of this power factor which
undoubtedly helped to prompt his remarks that: "We have an
interest in the independence and nonalignment of African
countries. We ask only that they take truly nonaligned
positions on world issues and on the roles of the major
7 4powers."
Finally, the dominant theme of his approach to Africa
was reiterated: "We will continue to encourage
evolutionary change in Southern Africa through
communication with the peoples of the area and through
75
encouragement of economic progress."
Richard Nixon left to his successor a foreign policy
legacy marked by four significant features, each of which
would have an effect on future relations with southern
Africa. First, the mechanism of foreign policy decision
making had become progressively more centralized and
compartmentalized within the executive branch. It included
the President, his personal advisors, and a small group of
analysts in the NSC and State Department, both of which
were headed by Henry Kissinger, after his appointment as
Secretary of State. Thus, to a substantial degree the
fortunes and fate of U.S. foreign policy had come to rest
more and more on the shoulders of one man and on his
abilities, organization, and use of available time.
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Second, the transition from the cold war to detente had
been facilitated, but the 'new' relations between the/
superpowers had not been thoroughly tested; had been
subjected to the icy chill of reactions over Soviet j
involvement in the Yom Kippur War of October 1973; and had
carried into the "new era" mutual propensities for
reflexive fears, mistrust, and apprehension.
Third, the foreign policy of the U.S. toward southern
Africa had been fully rationalized and elaborated in a
logical progression from NSSM 39 through Nixon's fourth
report to the Congress. During the Nixon years, the
official outlook on Africa had been that it neither
7 fi
represented nor involved "vital interests for the U.S.",
and that the dominant characteristic in Africa was the
prevalence of "intractable problems." Given these
"realities", the assumption and prescription that other
states become more self-reliant (Nixon Doctrine) , and the
prescription and expectation that the superpowers would not
interfere in Africa (an element of Detente), the operating
principle for U.S. policy was ''to leave Africa to the
Africans.'' These perceptions were representative of an
apparent paradox in the administration's thinking: its
attitudes indicated a marked bias toward preservation of
the status quo and yet seemed to acknowledge that if change
were indeed to come it ought to be through evolutionary
change. These seemingly contradictory notions lay at the
foundation of Nixon's policy toward southern Africa, whicn
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witnessed the gradual reorientation of U.S. tangible and
intangible interests away from support for black African
goals and aspirations and toward contact, communication,
and perceived, if unintentional, support of incumbent white
regimes.
Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, the American
domestic base was beginning to unravel for a number of
diverse reasons, many of which were directly associated
with the person and style of Nixon himself. Clearly,
post-Vietnam insecurities, frustrations, and doubts were
major contributing factors apart from Nixon, but he was
tainted by association with a number of its effects and
symbolic characterizations. The first was the growing
suspicion of the executive branch as an "imperial"
(dangerously non-democratic) source of power and decision
making in foreign policy matters. The second feature ^-.
concerned the secretiveness and exclusiveness of high level
personal diplomacy. Next, serious questions were being
asked about the authority to undertake and to provide
control over covert operations in a democracy (e.g., the
CIA role in the overthrow of Allende in Chile in 1973)
which involved a number of significant questions and /
problems related to national intelligence gathering and
clandestine operations. Finally, in these and other areas
of domestic and foreign concerns, the Congress was
beginning to reassert prerogatives and to raise questions
which for the Ford administration would become major
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stumbling blocks in pursuit of its foreign policy toward
southern Africa in late 1975 and early 1976.
C. 1974-1976, THE FORD ADMINISTRATION AND A NEW POLICY
TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA
The Ford Administration inherited the foreign policy
strengths and weaknesses of the Nixon era along with the
mechanisms and personnel that had superintended that
policy. Unfortunately, in policy matters and public
confidence, the U.S. had experienced a trying year prior to
August 9, 1974 when Gerald R. Ford assumed the Presidency.
Not only was the country troubled over its experiences in
Vietnam, but it had undergone a major domestic political
crisis in the Watergate scandal and Nixon's resignation.
U.S. - Soviet relations were floundering over continued
SALT II and Mutually Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR)
negotiations, and problems over trade and economic
relations produced through the mutual obstinacy of the two
countries. ^^ In other areas (e.g., energy problems, peace
efforts in the Middle East, the Cyprus Crisis, nuclear
non-proliferation, and mounting pressure of third world
power politics in opposition to the industrialized
countries and their policies )j events and trends seemed to
converge in increased frustrations and problem-ridden
concerns for the U.S. in 1974.^^
The new president was subjected to pressures almost
immediately. The increasingly important consequences of
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the Portuguese coup of April 1974, had begun to find
tangible expression by late in the year. The "winds of
change" had heightened black African and third world
pressure on the white regimes of southern Africa,
especially in the principal forum of expression, the U.N.
Thus, after unsuccessful attempts to have the Republic of
South Africa's "credentials" nullified and to expel her
from the U.N.(October 30, 1974), a ruling on November 12,
1974 temporarily suspended South Africa from participation
79
in the General Assembly. Later in the year, the U.S.
incurred a direct u.N. censure (December 13, 1974) for the
continued importation of chrome and nickel from Rhodesia
80
under the Byrd Amendment.
The continuity in U.S. policy toward southern Africa
under Ford was reflected in Secretary Kissinger's words to
the foreign ministers and permanent representatives of the
states in the OAU on September 23, 1975. Kissinger's /
address referred to the '"three major concerns" which
America had with regard to Africa:
That Africa attain prosperity for its people and become
a strong participant in the economic order, an economic
partner with a growing stake in the international
system; that self-determination, racial justice, and
human rights spread to all Africa; and that the
continent be free of greatpower rivalry or conflict.
In the same address. Secretary Kissinger referred to
the issue of Angola in such a muted tone that one is
compelled to note the dichotomy between "words and deeds.''
In the discussion and analysis to follow, it will become
obvious that Kissinger's knowledge of and involvement with
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the Angola situation was considerably more intimate than
his words to the OAU group seemed to convey. Kissinger
remarked:
But I want to say a cautionary word about Angola.
Events in Angola have taken a distressing turn, with
widespread violence. We are most alarmed at the
interference of extra-continental powers who do not
wish Africa well and whose involvement is inconsistent
with the promise of true independence. We believe a
fair and peaceful solution must be negotiated, giving
all groups representing the Angolan people a fair role
in its future. 82
One analyst concludes that U.S. involvement in Angola
was already considerable by September 1975, having been
re-initiated in January. At that time, the CIA and the NSC
"40 Committee," 83 cognizant of a renewed Soviet effort to
support the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
(MPLA) and of the prospect that the contending factions of
the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (NFLA) and
the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)
would be at a disadvantage in this circumstance, had
authorized the expenditure of $300,000 in CIA funds for
84
support of the FNLA. After a Soviet resupply of some
estimated 100 tons of arms and associated material to the
MPLA between March and June of 1975, the CIA, NSC and State
Department were directed to undertake a study of possible
alternative U.S. actions. On July 18, the "40 Committee"
approved an increase in U.S. covert assistance to both the
FNLA and UNITA. Bender reports that: "The $14 million
which was approved in July was increased to $25 million in
August and to about $32 million in November."
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Between July and August of 1975, however, the tactical
successes of the FNLA/UNITA forces reversed the earlier
successess of the MPLA achieved through July 1975. These
FNLA/UNITA successes were supported by South African,
Zairian, and miscellaneous 'Western' mercenary forces,
which internationalized the combat on a regional basis. In
response to the threat posed to the MPLA by the
intervention of South African forces on October 23, 1975,
the Soviets and Cubans undertook a substantial increase in
their support effort in late October and November 1975.
This support effort included more Soviet military equipment
and advisors and an increase in Cuban armed forces
, 86personnel
.
Further efforts by the Ford administration to bolster
the FNLA/UNITA forces, however, began to encounter
resistance within the Congress. Senate Foreign Relations
hearings were held on November 6, 1975 to ascertain the
degree to which U.S. covert operations in Angola had been
undertaken. Leaks of that hearing's testimony appeared
the next day in The New York Times which opened the issues
to public scrutiny and to an evolving polarization of the
issue between the administration and the Congress. ^'^
Through January of 1976 the administration continued to
push for an active U.S. role in financial and military
support to the FNLA/UNITA, but actions by the Senate and
House had effectively neutralized any prospect for
continued covert operations and seriously undermined
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administration proposals for direct overt support to the
FNLA/UNITA factions. In the meantime, the Cuban presence
and Soviet support had begun to turn the tactical advantage
back to the MPLA who by February 1976 had obtained a
8 8
substantial military victory throughout the country. °
In a statement on the "Implications of Angola for
Future U.S. Foreign Policy" before the Subcommittee on
African Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, January 29, 1976, Secretary Kissinger analyzed
the administration's position on Angola and what the
decision to withdraw from continued competition might mean
for U.S. foreign policy. The statement clearly revealed
the bipolar prism through which the administration, and
especially, Kissinger, continued to view the Angolan
situation, at the cost of perceiving accurately the
8 9
complicated internal dynamics of the situation. In
excerpts from the statement, Kissinger asserted that:
The classical pattern of accumulating marginal
advantage must be overcome and mankind must build more
constructive patterns if catastrophe is to be avoided.
But our efforts have been founded upon one
fundamental reality: peace requires a sense of
security, and security depends upon some form of
equilibrium between the great powers. And that
equilibirum is impossible unless the United States
remains both strong and determined to use its strengh
when required.
If a continent such as Africa, only recently freed
from external oppression, can be made the arena for
greatpower ambitions, if immense quantities of arms can
affect far-off events, if large expeditionary forces
can be transported at will to dominate virtually
helpless peoples - then all we have hoped for in




The effort of the Soviet Union and Cuba to take
unilateral advantage of a turbulent local situation
where they have never had any historical interests is a
willful, direct assault upon the recent constructive
trends in U.S. - Soviet relations and our efforts to
improve relations with Cuba. It is an attempt to take
advantage of our continuing domestic division and
self-torment. Those who have acted so recklessly must
be made to see that their conduct is unacceptable.
Angola represents the first time since the
aftermath of World War II that the Soviets have moved
militarily at long distances to impose a regime of
their choice. It is the first time that the United
States has failed to respond to Soviet military moves
outside their immediate orbit. And it is the first
time that Congress has halted the executive's action
while it was in the process of meeting this kind of
threat.
America's modest direct strategic and economic
interests in Angola are not the central issue. The
question is whether America still maintains the resolve
to act responsibly as a great power - prepared to face
a challenge when it arises, knowing that preventive
action now may make unnecessary a more costly response
later. 90
For Kissinger and the administration the principal
objective in Angola had been "'to respond to an
unprecedented application of Soviet power achieved in part
91through the expeditionary force of a client state." The
U.S. preoccupation with the bipolar relationship also
pervaded the second objective: "To help our friends in
black Africa who oppose Soviet and Cuban intervention." ^^
Observers and African specialists at State, in the
Congress, and in academia were taking into account
additional factors internal not only to Angola, but also to
the perceived mood and attitudes of the domestic
constituency in the U.S. For a number of the critics of
the administration's policy, global interests needed first
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of all to be balanced with realistic appraisals of the
capabilites of the FNLA/UNITA, their prospects for success,
and the resultant short and longer run advantages and
disadvantages of U.S. participation in the struggle. For
most of those critics, and for many different reasons, the
wisest course of action seemed to be to take 'no side' in
93
the struggle; that is, for America to stay out of Angola.
Some assessments of the Angolan crisis went even further in
suggesting that the administration had failed to
acknowledge one of the "vital lessons" of Vietnam — that
"both 'global' and 'local' circumstances must be carefully
considered before the U.S. commits itself to a faction in a
94foreign civil war."
U.S. policy problems over Angola were not ended, and
indeed were worsened, by the U.S. reluctance to recognize
the new MPLA government and insistence on tying South
African withdrawal from Angola to a complete withdrawal of
Soviet and Cuban forces. According to Colin Legum, a
letter circulated to the African heads of state prior to
the OAU summit of February 1976 suggesting this
precondition, linked the U.S. more completely to the RSA in
the eyes of some black Africans and alienated others like
Nigeria's head of state. General Murtala Mohammed. The
latter was prompted to criticize President Ford's
"presumption"'" and "flagrant insult" to the intelligence of
African rulers and to question: "How can we now be led to
believe that a Government with a record such as the U.S.
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has in Africa can suddenly become the defender of our
95interests?"
The crisis in Angola had revealed a number of basic
problems in the U.S. policy toward southern Africa. Not
only had the substantive efforts of the administration
failed to effect a desired outcome, but the Soviet and
Cuban presence had been firmly implanted in Angola,
threatening not only the rest of southern Africa, but also
U.S. interests regionally and globally. Furthermore, the
Angolan crisis had provided blatant proof of the lack of
domestic consensus on a policy not only for Angola but for
the region generally. Under these circumstances a serious
reappraisal of U.S. policy was called into existence
producing the one benefit that was to come of the Angola
crisis for U.S. policy - a new policy, founded on a new
role of restrained, but positive activism in the politics
of the region.
The new post-civil war policy was expressed by
Secretary Kissinger at Lusaka, Zambia on April 27, 1976.
According to Bender, that new policy was based on the U.S.
desire to prevent the Soviet Union and Cuba from expanding
their influence in the region and included a dual approach
First, to "vigorously" endorse majority rule in Rhodesia
and Namibia; and second, to "prevent 'further Angolas' by
threatening U.S. retaliation if the Soviets or Cubans
become involved in either of the territories dominated by
white minority regimes. . 96
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In its elaboration of a ten point plan for
transitioning Rhodesia to majority rule, the new policy
offered a combined U.S. - UK proposal for resolution of the
most urgent and potentially volatile issue in the region.
There was remarkable objectivity to the policy which
avoided choosing any of the "sides" or political factions
in the conflict over Rhodesia. Moreover, the new policy
marked the first occasion in the Nixon-Ford era when the
U.S. had taken a specific stand founded in both action and
rhetoric favoring demonstrable changes toward black
majority rule in the region. In his analysis of the
policy. Bender contends that the new policy averted an
"almost certain collision course with the Soviet Union
97
and/or Cuba over an issue [majority rule in Rhodesia.]"
In the process, the U.S. had refined its notion of 'leaving
Africa to the Africans' by allying itself with the opinions
and decisions, first, of the front line states, and second,
of the OAU. while the issue of majority rule in South
Africa was left purposefully vague, a more vehement
protestation was leveled against Pretoria for its policy of
apartheid. At Lusaka, Kissinger had urged the RSA to
utilize its influence to "promote a rapid negotiated
settlement for majority rule in Rhodesia." ^° In this
approach, the U.S. had redefined its relationship with
Pretoria while recognizing the continuing importance and




In the pronouncement of a new U.S. policy toward
southern Africa and the efforts of his shuttle diplomacy
that followed it, Kissinger once again displayed a
remarkable degree of flexibility and adaptability. From
the depths of frustration and ineffectiveness in the late
stages of the Angolan Crisis, the U.S. found itself by
September - October 1976 in the position of a major
mediator in the negotiations for transition to majorit
rule, particularly in Rhodesia. That turn of events had
neutralized the immediate opportunities for Soviet
involvement in accelerating guerilla warfare and
revolutionary change in the region. Moreover, the new U.S.
presence had dramatically improved the prospects for a
moderate course of development in the region under much
more stabilized circumstances,^^ although a clear potential
existed for further excelerations of conflict and
hostility. While there were many complex issues to be
encountered and solved, perhaps over a long period of time,
the U.S. had chosen a new course reflecting an awareness of
not only the African realities involved, but also the hopes
and aspirations of its people and leaders as well.
While the Ford administration had managed a remarkable
recovery in the reformulation and espousal of a southern
Africa policy, a number of problems rem.ained which became
focal points of election year politics regarding foreign
policy. The U.S. foreign policy proposals of the
Democratic Party Platform of 1976 focussed attention on

reorientation of U.S. thinking regarding "the intrinsic
importance of Africa and its development to the U.S." Such
thinking was viewed "in terms of enlightened U.S. -African
priorities, not a corollary of U.S. -Soviet policy." Among
the measures proposed in the party platform were:
1. To promote African economic development through
increased bilateral and multilateral assistance.
2. To reorient policy towards unequivocal and concrete
support of majority rule in southern Africa.
3. To tighten the arms embargo on RSA.
4. To deny tax advantages to all corporations doing
business in RSA and Rhodesia who support or participate in
apartheid practices and policies.
5. To repeal the Byrd Amendment and fully endorse UN -
ordered Rhodesian sanctions.
6. To avoid any activity regarding Namibia that would
recognize or support the illegal RSA administration of that
territory.
7. To undertake efforts to normalize relations with
Angola. 100
These proposals were to function as the operational
premises of the new Carter administration policy toward
Africa, yet difficulties remained over the legacy of U.S.
policy through the preceding years. Summing up the
problems of that past policy in an election night address
in Boston, Senator Dick Clark remarked that:
Indeed, the trouble with our African policy and with
much of our policy towards other nations and continents
is that it has been tied too closely to grand strategy
- too tightly to the perceived immediate exigencies of
thwarting Soviet power, and with too little thought
about either the indigenous needs of the people who are
affected by our policy or about the long-term interest
of the United States. 101
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D. U.S. POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE ANGOLAN CRISIS
The analysis to this point has presented an historical
review of U.S. foreign policy toward southern Africa in the
period 1954-1976. The developments of that period were
important elements preconditioning the international
competition that emerged over Angola in 1975-76. That
crisis found fundamental aspects of U.S. policy either
threatened or directly violated by the escalating nature of
Soviet and Cuban support to the MPLA. While U.S. covert
operations in support of the FNLA, and later the
FNLA/UNITA, may have been contributing factors to the
Soviet escalation, the outcome of the crisis found tne U.S.
handcuffed by domestic constraints on further commitments,
and the Soviets and Cubans rather firmly entrenched in
Angola. The crisis had produced a breakdown in the status
quo of the region through the combination of U.S. and
Soviet increases in financial and/or military support to
subnational factions; through the further
internationalization produced by the incursion of regional
combat forces; and through the inability of neighboring
states and the OAU to control or significantly influence




These breakdowns affected the essential features of
U.S. policy toward Africa which had extended from the
Kennedy years to the Ford Administration: noninterference
in the affairs of Africa by the superpowers; limits to arms
aid and sales as a means of maintaining a status quo among
the states of Africa; and the encouragement of Africans to
seek their own solutions for uniquely African problems.
With these essential features of U.S. policy affected, a
number of consequences emerged. Initially, there were
subjective consequences which involved new and rather
pressing questions concerning Soviet intentions; however,
these brought into focus the full range of perceptions and
counter-questions about both Soviet and U.S. behavior over
Angola, and the global relations and intentions of the
great powers. Analysts or observers in the U.S. whose
perceptions were based on a cumulative assessment of Soviet
adventurism in the Middle East, the continued buildup of
Soviet strategic and conventional forces, the 'threat' of
her expanding Navy, and the impressive dimensions of her
logistical air and naval support to the Cubans and MPLA in
Angola, found more than sufficient indicators to conclude
that the Soviets were exhibiting blatant pursuit of world
hegemony.
For others, less inclined to believe that the Soviets
could even have (much less be embarked on) a 'grand
design', Soviet opportunism in Angola, along with the
aforementioned manifestations of increased power and
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"reach", posed a new and substantial reason for
re-evaluating the premises, expectations, and policy of
detente. While perceptions and conclusions varied, the
result of these analyses was becoming clearer: Soviet
involvement in southern Africa had added a new and
complicated dimension to U.S. -Soviet relations, which
tended to provoke a tougher, more cautious U.S. approach in
the fragile relationship of detente.
The Angolan Crisis was a watershed in the history of
African decolonization. By the time the crisis had been
settled with the MPLA's military victory in February 1976
and its recognition as the de facto power (the People's
Republic of Angola), the political climate of southern
Africa had been radically changed. The line of white
redoubt had been pushed further south - now the outstanding
issues were majority rule in Rhodesia, independence for
Namibia from South Africa's "illegal" hold, and the
ultimate problems of an end to apartheid and the
development of autonomous political participation for South
Africa's black majority. Prospects for settling these
issues peacefully seemed, in the short run, to be far less
likely given the Angolan precedent of massive outside
intervention in the military-political struggle. The
problems of southern Africa had undergone a major
internationalization, adding another complex and
potentially volatile dimension to the already complicated




in the southern African power equation had been dealt
serious setbacks in the Angolan crisis. The OAU had
exhibited little influence in ameliorating the internal
conflicts of the three Angolan nationalist factions, and
the South African armed forces commited to the Angolan
offensive in October 1975 had met with substantial enough
resistance (both military and political) to be withdrawn
without having achieved either a military decision or a
favorable political result by its intervention. In short,
the power politics of southern Africa had undergone a
dramatic, if not traumatic, readjustment. Superpower
presence had altered the power situation significantly, but
had not clarified the uncertain dimension of prospective
violence in the region. Moreover, superpower involvement
had complicated the number and nature of available options
for competing factions and groupings within the region,
adding yet another element of uncertainty.
The issues at stake in the political conflict of
southern Africa had assumed a new cast with the increased
interest, presence, and participation of the superpowers.
The competitive nature of their relationship had increased
the importance of their influencing or solving the region's
political problems as a means of gaining access to or
influence over economic markets, rich resources, favorable
strategic dispositions, and status and prestige in the
political courting of third world nations. These factors
tended to further complicate the nature of southern
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Africa's problems as the region became an increasingly
important meeting ground of competing values, interests,
goals, and ideologically-tinged aspirations. Southern
Africa had become a highly complicated web manifesting
uncertain prospects for either stability or chaos.
Indeed, uncertainty and complexity were the principal
elements of the situation in southern Africa as
James E. Carter and his administration came to power
in January of 1977.
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III. 1977-198 THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION
This chapter on the Carter Administration and its
policy toward southern Africa will follow a different
analytical approach than the preceding chapter which was
principally a chronological approach. The following
analysis of the Carter Administration is founded upon the
proposition that a major internal transition has occurred
in its foreign policy outlook and priorities. This
transition, probably underway from as early as mid-1978,
has become a clear manifestation in mid-1980. The
significance of the transition is directly related to the
changing perspectives of the Administration regarding U.S.
relations with the Soviet Union. That critical element of
foreign policy has begun to forge considerable changes in
the overall foreign policy outlook that marked the early
years of the Administration (from 1977 to late 1979). Thus
it is possible to speak of two distinct phases in the
Carter Administration's foreign policy. It is within this
analytical framework that the development of and
alterations in the Carter Administration's foreign policy
toward southern Africa will be examined.
A. FOREIGN POLICY IN TPJ^JS^SITION AND POTENTIAL CRISIS
The foreign policy of the United States under the
Carter Administration has been marked most significantly by
two transitional phases. The first transition was the
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thoroughgoing and purposeful alteration in political
philosophy and mode of conduct in foreign affairs following
the Nixon and Ford Administrations. In both philosophy and
style, the Carter Administration had rejected its
predecessors' penchant for thinking and practicing
'realpolitik
'
/ their proclivity for secretive, centralized
and personalized diplomacy; and their view of international
affairs as essentially bipolar. The second transition,
more complex and more difficult to analyze because it is
still in progress, is and has been the internal
readjustment, redefinition and even reversal of the foreign
policy outlook and behavior of the administration in the
face of certain compelling realities. The Carter
Administration has been confronted by perceived setbacks
not only in the form of international challenges and
issues, but also in the form of sharpened and more
persistent dissent and criticism at home. In 1979,
national political awareness had already been heightened
due largely to the domestic and international economic
problems of inflation and energy and the domestic politics
of a forthcoming election year. The crises in Iran
(November 1979) and Afghanistan (December 1979), however,
have stimulated a dramatic upsurge of popular concern in
the U.S. with foreign affairs. President Carter and the
members of his administration have begun to respond to
these forces of international challenge and domestic
pressure, in a manner which provides clear indications that
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U.S. foreign policy is undergoing a major transition. ^02
In the short term, this second transition has produced a
fluid and uncertain dimension to the conduct of foreign
affairs. Perhaps even more significantly, however, it has
tended to blur the sharp images of thought and perception
that had emerged during the first several years of the
administration when the predominant emphasis was clearly
derived from a pluralistic, "world order" conception of
America's role in foreign affairs.
While time will permit a clearer understanding and
better historical perspective, there is sufficient evidence
to outline the major features of both transitions of the
Carter Administration. The first phase marked the
transition in philosophy, principle, and action away from
the dominant foreign policy outlook of the
Nixon-Kissinger-Ford era toward the "new world order"
international thinking of the Carter Administration.
Political thought, prescription and action were dominated
by the concepts of a pluralistic, diversified world
environment; by a deemphasis in relative importance of the
bipolar relations of the U.S. and the Soviet Union; by the
emphasis given to the policy of human rights; by the
promulgation of stricter arms control policies; and by the
implementation of a regional approach to foreign policy
problems rather than the geopolitical - ' realpolitik
'
approach of the Kissinger era. In the Carter
Administration, phase one was a period marked by the
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assertion of a U.S. foreign policy which acknowledged a
leadership role for the U.S., but a role circumscribed
(beyond the limits envisaged by Nixon and Kissinger) by the
realities and demands of a progressively more complex and
highly diversified world environment. The Carter
Administration, like its immediate predecessors, had
accepted the view that the power and influence of the
United States was relatively diminished in comparison with
earlier periods (the late 40's, 50's, and 60's) when the
strategic and conventional military strengths of the United
States and the Soviet Union had been the focal point for
the creation of both the image and reality of two opposing
international power blocs. While perceptions were not
always clear about which state possessed the most (or the
best) strategic nuclear strength, the threat of nuclear war
and the capability of the superpowers to inflict
unacceptable and relatively assured destruction upon each
other was a perceived reality which dominated the cold war
years and conferred upon the two leaders a preponderant
political influence in the international community. The
perceived disequilibrium in U.S. - Soviet strategic
strength evidenced by the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962
began to be rectified by the Soviets in a major military
buildup starting in approximately 1968. The Soviet advance
toward strategic parity ran roughly parallel with a second
influence which sapped the confidence and the self-image of
the U.S., the unsuccessful effort to effect a satisfactory
-74-

result in the war in Vietnam. No other event in the
post-war years had given the U.S. pause to reflect on the
limits of its power and influence (and even its will) as
did the national trauma and tragedy of the Vietnam War.
Its imprint was sharply etched in the thinking of the
Carter Administration as the most significant indication
that the world had become dramatically more complex and
that the U.S. must be much more cautious in its commitment
to the entanglements of Third World problems.
In the U.S., perceptions of important changes in the
world situation had led Nixon and Kissinger to refer to a
"new era of international relations" and to a new role for
the foreign affairs of the U.S. Strategic parity with the
Soviets, the intractable nature of Third World problems,
and the limits on U.S. resources available to effect its
political will in an intransigent outside world had led to
the redefinition of the role for the U.S. in foreign
affairs. These were embodied in the Nixon Strategy and
contributed in part to the style and method of Mr.
Kissinger's personal diplomacy. Under President Carter,
the role of the U.S. was further redefined but in terms
designed to effect "affirmative approaches" rather than
reactive approaches. In this regard, the Carter
Administration perceived that the near- and long-term
interests and advantages of the U.S. lie in the ability and
willingness to affirmatively facilitate the emerging (if as
yet not well defined) "new world order". Thus, for the
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Carter Administration, in phase one, the role of the United
States was viewed as more limited in its direct ability to
influence or control events and developments in the world
at large (particularly through military means), and yet as
well-positioned and equipped politically, socially, and
economically to affect and influence indirectly the form
and means by which the world, and particularly the emerging
Third World, would evolve toward a "new order - a new
international economic order, political order, information
order, and technological order . "'^^
For the Carter Administration, however, a transition to
phase two seems quite clearly to have come into existence
by January of 1980. Dissappointments and setbacks
encountered through the first three years of the
administration had resulted in a gradual reassessment and
readjustment of policy outlook and position. By 1979, the
issue of human rights, once termed by President Carter "the
soul of our foreign policy ," '^'^had been quietly withdrawn
from the forefront of the administration's international
concerns. Even the tough-minded early pronouncements of
policy concerning controls on arms sales and military
assistance to Third World countries had been eroded by the
compelling reality that arms were a key element in U.S. bl-
and multilateral diplomatic negotiations. Moreover, the
administration had stood firm for nearly three years
against the tide of rising protest and criticism of U.S.
geopolitical decline (primarily as the result of the
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continuing Soviet strategic and conventional military
buildup; and the evidence of Soviet aggressive
opportunism, military flexibility, and expansion of
influence in Africa and South-East Asia). However,
following the Soviet's incursion into Afghanistan in late
December 1979, the administration was compelled to
undertake a searching re-evaluation of its premises and
expectations in dealing with the Soviet Union. That event,
coupled with the international embarrassment and tragedy of
the Iranian hostage crisis, had focussed national attention
on the rampant instability and potential threat to our
vital interests in the Persian Gulf.
These events and particularly the increased perceived
threats to vital interests in the Persian Gulf region have
resulted in a major shift in administration perspective and
policy. That shift is the essential feature of phase two
in the foreign policy of the Carter Administration.
Already it has been marked by a number of significant
developments. Among these are: the revitalization of a
bipolar perspective of world events and developments, the
emergence of heightened confrontation politics with the
Soviets, and the suspension of the SALT II Treaty
ratification process in the Senate. Furthermore, the
resignation of Secretary of State Vance can be seen in part
as the result of the bureaucratic conflict that was going
on within the administration over the primacy of the
policies and mode of phase one or the presumed need for the
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U.S. foreign policy caught up in such dramatic events
and in such potentially extensive transition is a foreign
policy which already exhibits crisis characteristics. It
is faced with the prospect of reorientating and adjusting
itself while holding together certain of the demonstrable
advances and advantages it had attained during phase one,
including its relations with the Third World and
particularly with Africa. Thus, for example, having
employed the techniques and practices of the phase one
period to facilitate a settlement to the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia
problem, the Carter Administration now faces a heightened
prospect that excessive concern about the Soviets could
undercut or even reverse the role the U.S. played in the
settlement process.
The above explication of two phases in the foreign
policy of the Carter Administration establishes the
analytical framework for examining its policy toward
southern Africa. In a process already begun, the following
examination will concentrate on the philosophical
underpinnings of the Carter Administration approach to the
formulation and implementation of the policies which helped
to facilitate the emergence of the independent and
sovereign state of Zimbabwe in April 1980.
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E. INITIAL FOREIGN POLICY EFFORTS AND THE CARTER
ADMINISTRATION'S WORLD VIEW
As the Carter Administration assumed control of the
U.S. foreign policy in early 1977, the Democratic platform
proposals for U.S. policy toward Africa began slowly to be
incorporated into a fully rationalized and
institutionalized foreign policy for Africa. Two key
appointments indicated the interest and concern of
President Carter in the Third World and especially in
African problems. The first was his appointment of the
experienced, moderate, and highly respected Cyrus R. Vance,
as Secretary of State, and the second was the symbolic and
psychological advantage found in appointing the first
black, Andrew Young, as U.S. Representative to the United
Nations. Both men became influential actors and spokesmen
of the administration's concerns for and policy toward the
Third World, and especially for the heightened interest of
U.S policy generally toward Africa. U.S. concern with that
continent was first demonstrable in the visits to Africa of
high-level administration officials such as Mr. Vance and
Mr. Young (in his ten day visit to the continent in
February 1977), and of President Carter in his trip to
Africa in April of 1978.
The early visits to Africa made by Young and then Vance
were designed not only as symbolic gestures, but also as a
means by which to solicit the views and recommendations of
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African leaders as inputs and checks of the developing
corpus of U.S. policy toward Africa. After several months,
of analysis and gestation, that policy was formalized by
Secretary Vance in an address entitled "The United States
and Africa - Building Positive Relations" on July 1, 1977.
In an analysis of that address, Jennifer Seymour Whitaker
notes that Secretary Vance:
. . . emphasized the need to take an affirmative rather
than a reactive approach, minimize the East-West
competition so as not to allow it to distort regional
events, recognized the importance to African states of
economic development and indigenous nationalism, and
affirm that economic cooperation and active diplomacy
will constitute the main forms of interaction, with
military ties and arms sales downplayed . 10*7
A casual reading of Mr. Vance's address might lead one
to judge that the Carter approach to Africa was little more
than an evolutionary step along the track established by
Mr. Kissinger's initiatives in southern Africa in April
1976. Under closer examination, however, the address
actually defines an emerging Africa policy of the Carter
Administration involving important departures from its
predecessor, not only in philosophical outlook, but also in
the assessment of U.S. policy interests and stakes involved
in its relations with the continent. The Carter approach,
rather than merely adjusting to the lead of its
predecessor, had organized its thinking around a profoundly
different mentality concerning Third World problems and had
reconstructed a foreign policy to foster its views of the
best interests of the U.S. Indeed, it is perhaps the
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essential difference in the Carter approach to southern
Africa in phase one that the problems of that region were
viewed first (and primarily) on their own terms, and then
as matters which affected and could be affected by U.S.
interests there and in the rest of the continent. Thus, an
increased and even major importance seems to have been
attributed to the local complexities of "regional events"
and to the analyses, objectives, and problem-solving
techniques of black African leaders, with a resolve to
fashion or re-fashion U.S. interests and participation as
supporting, or even secondary, elements of the overall
problem-solving process.
One of the early indications of a new Carter
Administration perspective on U.S. interests in Africa
could be found in the comments of William E. Schaufele,
Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, who
in an April 16, 1977 address before the American Academy of
Political and Social Science in Philadelphia specifically
refuted the notions that U.S. interests in southern Africa
were either strategic, military, or even primarily
economic. As Adam and Stebbins have noted, by implication,
Schaufele was indicating that "U.S. policies in southern
Africa were founded in political interests - and, not
least, on the concern for human rights and human dignity in
Rhodesia, Namibia, and the Republic of South Africa. "-^^^
Such an implication was made explicit in the address on
U.S. policy toward Africa by Mr. Vance in whicn he
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prescribed not only the policy interest toward Africa, but
also the basic propositions from which it was to proceed:
. . . our policies must recognize the unique identity
of Africa. We can be neither right nor effective, if
we treat Africa simply as one part of the Third World,
as a testing ground of East-West competition. -^^^
Functioning with this basic proposition in mind, the basic
objective and method of U.S. policy toward Africa would be:
. . . to foster a prosperous and strong Africa that is
at peace with the world. The long term success of the
African policy will depend more on our actual
assistance to African development and our ability to
help Africans resolve their disputes than on maneuvers
for short-term diplomatic advantage .... the future
of Africa will be built by African hands. Our
interests and our ideals will be served as we offer our
own support. ^^^
Evidence of such support had already been signalled in
the successful effort by the Carter Administration to have
the Byrd Amendment repealed. No other overt action by the
U.S. had carried the symbolic repudiation of previous
administrations' supposed good will and supportive rhetoric
toward black African nationalists as had that legislative
provision which permitted the U.S. to import chrome and
nickel from Rhodesia in defiance of the U.N. economic
sanctions mandated in 1966. Following a vigorous effort by
the administration to seek its repeal, the Eyrd Amendment
was terminated on March 18, 1977, only eight weeks into the
new administration. •^-'•^
Other concerted efforts in the early months of the
administration were directed at revitalizing the role of
- <^

the U.S. in making headway toward resolution of the
independence problems in Rhodesia and Namibia and toward
progress in black political participation in the Republic
of South Africa. In regard to Rhodesia, on March 10, 1977,
President Carter and British Prime Minister Callaghan had
agreed to a new joint effort to resolve that problem
peacefully with a new timetable aimed at achieving
independence for Zimbabwe under majority rule by sometime
in 1978. H2 j^ May of 1977, Secretary Vance and British
Foreign Secretary David Owen began to hammer out the
details of the joint U.S. -British initiative under which
the transition to black majority rule would presumably take
place. ^-^^ With regard to the problems in Namibia, the
U.S., on April 7th, had joined with the other four Western
nations represented in the U.N. Security Council (Canada,
France, West Germany, and the United Kingdom) to reassert
their commitment to U.N. Security Council Resolution 385
and to urge South Africa's Prime Minister Johannes Vorster
to set aside the so-called Windhoek Plan-^-*-^ which was
deemed totally unacceptable given the criteria set down in
Resolution 385. And in mid-May, Vice President Mondale met
in Vienna with Prime Minister Vorster "to convey the new
policies of our administration, regarding southern Africa -
specifically Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa itself."
Put most simply, the policy which the President wished
me to convey was that there was need for progress on
all three issues: majority rule for Rhodesia and
Namibia and a progressive transformation of South
African society to the same end. We believed it was
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particularly important to convey the depth of our
convictions .^^
The active pursuit of desirable changes in southern
Africa by the Carter administration seemed very much indeed
to spring from deep convictions. Those convictions may not
have been readily identifiable (or even believable) to
domestic or foreign observers in the first year of the
administration; but the official speeches, pronouncements,
and actions of high level administration personnel during
the first two years of the administration now constitute a
body of empirical evidence which reflect the political
philosophy and world view out of which the new foreign
policy of the U.S. was constructed. The critical
relationship of those thoughts to the formulation and
implementation of the Carter approach to foreign policy
makes it instructive on its own m.erit to identify and
examine the intellectual and philosophical underpinnings of
the emergent foreign policy of the Carter Administration
not only for its relevance in phase one, but as the point
of departure for adaptations being undertaken in philosophy
and outlook in phase two. Four features of the Carter
Administration's philosophy and world view deserve
particular attention: the premises of the philosophy and
world view, the view concerning the nature of change, the
goals of foreign policy as a reflection of philosophy and




The political philosophy and world view of the Carter
Administration appear to have been founded on at least
four premises. First and foremost, change in the world of
domestic and especially international poltical life was
inevitable. The fundamental interest of the U.S. and its
political leadership was to get on the side of change or
even to foster it in desirable directions, rather than to
stand in its way or to simply react to it. Second,
political leadership in the U.S. should strive to have its
political activity guided by the moral and ethical
principles and values to be found in the essential
character of the nation. Third, the U.S. retained
significant responsiblities in its role as a world leader,
not only in relation to its allies and adversaries, but now
progressively toward the Third World and to the unresolved
problems affecting all humanity and the well being of the
planet. The fourth premise seemed at once to energize the
others and in part to spring from them - the fundamental
humanism that pervaded the political thinking and rhetoric
of the administration. At its source one could detect a
kind of moral repugnance at the depersonalized,
dehumanizing nature of the bipolar confrontation, cold war,
and attendant disregard for the "human element" in the
foreign policy pursuits of the U.S. in the preceding
decades.
Perhaps the central concern of the Carter
Administration has been its observation of and philosophy
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regarding the nature of change in today's world. Viewed as
an inevitable phenomenon in today's world, change was, and
continues to be perceived as extraordinarily complex,
ongoing, and vast in both its extensive and intensive
dimensions. The President's National Security Advisor,
Zbigniew Brzezinski, has enunciated the view that a simple
proposition helps explain the complexity of today's world;
"we are living in an era of the most extensive and
intensive political change in human history . . . our
generation is living through a genuine global political
awakening. "-'•^'^ President Carter has repeatedly referred to
the phenomena of change and has expressed the view that,
"when I took office two years ago . . . , I was convinced
that America had to pursue a changed course in a world
IIP
which was itself undergoing vast change. " ^^°
Critics of the Carter Administration have pointed out
the potential weakness of being too preoccupied with the
nature of change and especially witn change in the Third
World. Robert W. Tucker, for example, has suggested that
the concern of the Carter Administration with "how to play
a constructive role in this change, how to get on the side
of it rather than to oppose it and to suffer increasing
isolation from so many nations and peoples . . . has
119
continued to evoke uncertainty in policy.' Given the
implications of this concern with change (which included
the view that the international system had become far more
complex, far less hierarchical, more interdependent, and
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less susceptible to the arbitrament of force as a means by
which to resolve conflicts of interest), Tucker argues that
the Carter Administration saw itself oriented toward a
relevant future, in contrast with the Kissinger era in
which U.S. foreign policy had been "mired in an irrevelant
1 20past." According to Tucker's analysis, "the principal
policy expression of this contrast was the emphasis placed
by the Carter Administration on the importance of
North-South relations" and its rejection of the Kissinger
preoccupation with the tradition-bound perspectives of the
East-West relationship. ^^'- Moreover, "world order''
politics were evoked in the North-South relationship, while
the East-West relationship conjured up the irrelevance of
122balance-of-power politics.
Other observers, however, have perceived the world view
and political philosophy of the Carter Administration quite
differently. One observer contends that there are members
of the Carter Administration who share some of the
perceptual and intellectual outlooks of Henry Kissinger.
Peter Jay, British Ambassador to the United States from
1977 to 1979, asserts that an undeclared intellectual
consensus exists between Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew
Brzezinski
:
The undeclared intellectual consensus . . . goes well
beyond the general notion of creative global pluralism
as a basis for American involvement with friends and
neutrals. The need for a higher cause than mere
equilibrium and order, for a moral dimension, for the
recognition that the necessary equilibrium and order
have to be dynamic, not static, for appreciation of the
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flexibility of political multipolar ity contrasted with
the rigidity of military bipolarity, for relevance to
the problems of the emerging two-thirds of the world,
for avoiding exclusive preoccupation with U.S. -Soviet
relations, for seeking positive relations with the
Third World, for acknowledgement of turmoil as a
permanent condition of the world, for a new order
adjusted to this turbulence and for engaging the moral
sanctions of the American public - all emerge as shared
themes in their conceptual work (though not always in
their policy making). -^23
Though certain conceptual themes may be shared by
Kissinger and Brzezinski, there have been distinctive
differences expressed by President Carter's assistant for
national security affairs. Even though he holds the
distinction of being the most widely recognized "hard-
liner" in the Carter Administration's higher echelons, Dr
Brzezinski has developed something of a reputation as the
most eloquent spokesman in the administration in expounding
its philosophical and political views regarding change and
its implications in today's world. Among the most
important changes that have occurred in the international
environment. Dr. Brzezinski includes those that have
occurred in the relationship between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union, changes in the world at large, and the
changes that have demanded alteration in the nature of U.S.
foreign policy. Each of these are elements found in an
address prepared for the Trilateral Commission meeting in
Bonn, West Germany, October 30, 1977, in which Dr.
Brzezinski presented an analysis of "American Foreign
Policy and Global Change":
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mA secure and economically cooperative community of the
advanced industrial democracies is the necessary source
of stability for a broad system of international
cooperation. We are aware of the pitfalls of
constructing a geometric world . . . that leaves out
the majority of mankind who live in the developing
countries. A global structure that would ignore this
reality would be inhumane, for it would reflect
indifference to the hardships of others; it would be
unrealistic, for we cannot ignore scores of nations
with whom we are increasingly interdependent; and it
would be damaging in the long run, for the problems
that we neglect today will come back in a more virulent
form tomorrow. We are therefore seeking to create a
new political and international order that is truly
more participatory and genuinely more responsive to the
global desire for greater social justice, equity, and
more opportunity for individual self-fulfillment.
East-West relations, notably U.S. -Soviet relations,
involve and will continue to involve elements of both
competition and cooperation. We are quietly confident
about our ability and determination to compete,
economically, politically, and militarily. But
anaging a relationship that will be both competitive
and cooperative cannot be permitted to dominate all our
perspectives. Today, we do not have a realistic choice
between an approach centered on the Soviet Union, or
cooperation with our trilateral friends, or on
North-South relations. Instead, each set of issues
must be approached on its own terms. A world where
elements of cooperation prevail over competition
entails the need to shape a wider and more cooperative
global framework. VJe did not wish the world to be this
complex; but we must deal with it in all its
complexity, even if it means having a foreign policy
which cannot be reduced to a single and simplistic
slogan.
[Foreign policy today] . . . calls for support
based on reason ... A concentrated foreign policy
must give way to a complex foreign policy, no longer
focussed on a single, dramatic task - such as the
defense of the West. Instead, we must engage ourselves
on the distant and difficult goal of giving shape to a
world that has suddenly become politically awakened and
socially restless. 124
The goals of U.S. foreign policy as a reflection of the
Carter Administration's philosophy and world view in phase
one seem to have been definitively tailored to facilitate
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what Brzezinski has termed a central design. That is "to
make the United States constructively relevent to a world
of turbulent change. "-^^^ As the President's early speeches
indicated, and especially his May 22, 1977 address on
"Foreign Policy and National Character" at Notre Dame, the
five priorities of U.S. policy in the order of their
importance to him, personally, were human rights, relations
with and among the democracies, relations with the Soviet
Union, taking steps to improve the chances for lasting
peace in the Middle East, and attempting to reduce the
danger of nuclear proliferation and the world-wide spread
of conventional weapons. -^^^ However, by February of 1979,
the foreign policy objectives of the President had been
more carefully enumerated and consisted of the following
four broad objectives:
1. To buttress American power on which global security
and stability depend;
2. To strengthen our relations with other nations
throughout the world in order to widen the spirit of
international cooperation;
3. To deal constructively with pressing world problems
which otherwise will disrupt and even destroy the world
community we seek;
4. To assert our traditional commitment to human
rights, rejoining a rising tide of belief in the
dignity of the individual .-'27
At some point philosophical outlook must encounter the
practical matter of how to implement policy and how to
effect the specific means and methods by which to transfer
policy into action. While much of this process was
undertaken in a rather conventional diplomatic fashion, the
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Carter Administration demonstrated certain unique
propensities of thought, word, and activity. First, the
administration's approach to foreign policy seemed to be
constructed on a clearly "positivist" approach to problems
— problems that could be properly identified were
susceptible to solution, particularly through the
application of hard work, dedication, and patient efforts
to see the problem- solving effort through to a
satisfactory conclusion. The proper identification of
problems required not only a reappraisal of the foreign
policy problems facing the U.S. but also the application of
a more eclectic technique in examining each problem. Thus,
problems were viewed not only (or just) in the way the
problem affected American geopolitical interests, but in
terms of the problem itself - that is in terms of its local
complexities. One element of the local complexity of a
problem was the way in which the problem might be viewed by
local and regional actors who shared some stake or concern
in both the resolution of the problem and in the
process(es) by which it was resolved. Such a perspective
opened up new prospects for weighing the relative interests
of the U.S. not only in terms of the local and regional
aspects of a given problem, but also in terms of the
potential each problem exhibited for conflict and/or
cooperation between the superpowers.
On May 22, 1977, in a commencement address at the
University of Notre Dame, the President expressed his views

regarding the methods he wished to see employed in the
conduct of foreign policy under his administration. The
President asserted that:
I believe we can have a foreign policy that is
democratic, that is based on fundamental values, and
that uses power and influence, which we have, for
humane purposes. Vie can also have a foreign policy
that the American people both support and for a change,
know about and understand . ^^^
Perhaps the most significant alteration in method and
perspective of the administration in phase one was its
deemphasis of the East-West relationship as the principal
lens through which to view U.S. foreign policy. The
President seems clearly to have expected that relations
with the Soviets could be continued and even furthered
under the rubric of detente, though in a modified form that
would emphasize more fully a cooperative and enlightened
self-restraint. Thus, in an address on "U.S. -Soviet
Relations" in Charleston, S.C. on July 21, 1977, the
President expressed the belief that: "What matters
ultimately is whether we can create a relationship of
cooperation that will be rooted in the national interests
of both sides. We shape our own policies to accommodate a
constantly changing world, and we hope the Soviets will do




While the complexity of the relationship continued to
be recognized, particularly in such concepts as the
1 or)
multi-layered nature of the relationship, ~^^critics such as
Robert W. Tucker suggest that the primary deficiency of the
Carter reorganization of priorities regarding the Soviets
lay in the fact that the administration did not consider
the Soviets a serious threat. ^-^-^ While advisors close to
the President, such as Dr. Brzezinski, were hardly likely
to consider the Soviets not a serious threat, it is
important to emphasize the positive role and expectation of
the State Department as a major force in outlining the
administration stance toward the Soviets. In this regard.
Secretary Vance was particularly influential. His
perspective is very clear in statements he made before the
House Committee on International Relations on June 19,
1978:
The potential we and the Soviets share for mutual
annihilation carries its imperative for us both: We
must seek to reduce the risks of confrontation,
particularly the risks presented by an uncontrolled
nuclear arms race; to work to moderate our differences;
and to seek to expand other areas of mutually
beneficial cooperation ... In short, ... we seek
to emphasize the work of peace. But obviously detente
is a two way street: The future course of our
relations will depend also upon the choices made in
Moscow. ^^^
With regard to methods of implementing U.S. foreign
policy, one further comment might be instructive in
defining the mode of operation of the administration. The
decentralized, and somewhat disorganized, structure of the
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top figures in the administration promoted the semblance
(if not the reality) of a broader participation in the
foreign policy process of the U.S. than had been the case
under Dr. Kissinger. The result promoted broadened
opportunities for disseminating Carter perspectives and
policy views and effected increased opportunities for
absorbing the views and recommendations of other interested
actors or spokesmen on the varied problems arising as
foreign policy concerns for the U.S. This "technique" had
its pitfalls, however, as the eventual resignation of
Ambassador Young over secret consultations with Palestinian
Liberation Organization representatives in September 1979
would amply demonstrate. Nevertheless, the personal and
conference diplomacy of multiple U.S. diplomatic actors
insured the availability of considerably more feedback to
the President on the important issues and problems facing
him and U.S. foreign policy.
C. THE DRAMA OF POLITICAL INITIATIVES, STALEMATE AND
BREAKTHROUGH ON RHODESIA
In mid-1977, the potential for increased conflict over
Rhodesia was very real. On July 5, 1977, forty-eight
members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) meeting
in Gabon had endorsed the notion that the Patriotic Front
should continue its tactic of guerilla warfare as the best
means by which to pursue black majority rule in Rhodesia.
In an effort to placate growing opposition to the status
-94-

.!Uo in Rhodesia, Ian Smith announced on July 18 his
intention to dissolve the Rhodesian parliament and to hold
general elections on August 31. His purpose was to seek
voter approval of a plan calling for an ''internal
settlement" with moderate black nationalist leaders, a new
constitution, and broader political participation for
blacks in the nev/ government. Smith's proposals had set in
motion a new and complicated dimension to the resolution of
the Rhodesian situation.
In August, U.S. initiatives to cut through the
complicated web of problems were stepped up in two parallel
developments. The first was an effort by President Carter
in early August to seek a common ground and mutually
agreeable plans for dealing with the problems in concert
v;ith the Front Line states. Following two days of talks
wich President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, widely
acknowledged as the unofficial leader of the group and as a
leading spokesman of black African political views and
aspirations, the President announced on August 5 that the
leaders had reached almost "complete agreement" on a
diplomatic policy to promote peaceful transition to black
majority rule in both Rhodesia and Namibia. The second
development, which began following Secretary Vance's visit
to London on August 12, involved the initiation of
intensive consultations between American and British





On August 31, 1977, the final details of the new
Anglo-American Plan for Rhodesia were completed. These
details were made public the following day in a British
White Paper. The proposals contained in the plan were
directed at a "restoration of legality in Rhodesia and the
134
settlement of the Rhodesian problem." The plan
contained seven "elements" among which were "the surrender
of power by the illegal regime", permitting '"orderly and
peaceful transition to independence", a provision for ''free
and impartial elections", a transitional administration
under the British government, a U.N. presence during the
transition period, a new Independence Constitution, and a
Development Fund of between US $1000 million and $1500
million to revive the economy of the country contingent
135
upon "implementation of the settlement as a whole."
Prospects for a successful resolution of the
long-standing problem of Rhodesia based on the
Anglo-American Plan were severely dimmed by the reluctance
of the Patriotic Front (Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe) to
endorse it, and by the disregard shown the proposals by
Rhodesia's Prime Minister Ian Smith and his Rhodesian Front
Party. The Rhodesian elections of August 31 had resulted
in a vote of overwhelming confidence for the Rhodesian
Front Party and for Prime Minister Smith, who accepted the
vote as a mandate to negotiate his own plan for an internal
settlement. Negotiations within Rhodesia to that end
resulted in Smith's presentation on November 24, 1977 of a

"modified version of his plan for an internal settlement '
that would involve the establishment of majority rule,
based on adult suffrage, under conditions to be negotiated
with black leaders inside the country." ^^^ The outline of
this proposal was effected in the so-called Salisbury
Agreement of March 3, 1978 which saw the signing of the
"Internal Settlement" agreement by the black Rhodesian
leaders Senator Jeremiah Chirau, Reverend Ndabaningi
Sithole and Bishop Abel Muzorewa.
The em.ergence of this agreement for an internal
settlement, (which provided only the semblance of black
majority rule by December 31, 1978), produced the principal
result of galvanizing international opposition to Smith's
initiatives. Nkomo and Mugabe were quick to denounce the
settlement at the U.N. on March 8. On March 14, the U.N.
Security Council in Resolution 423 declared any settlement
under the auspices of the Smith regime "illegal and
unacceptable." Somewhat belatedly, on March 25-26, four
of the five African front-line states, all of whom opposed
the internal settlement, announced their backing of the
Anglo-American plan. Efforts to revitalize negotiations
based on this latter plan found the Patriotic Front at last
agreeing to an all-party conference after meeting with
Vance, Owen, Young and the front-line Presidents between
April 14-16, 1978. ^^^
Political machinations and maneuvering over Rhodesia
would mark the remainder of 1978 as proponents for one plan
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or the other attempted to wrest support for their option
from important political actors or constituencies.
Following the swearing in of Muzorewa, Sithole, and Chirau
as co-leaders in the new Rhodesian Executive Councl (March
21, 1978), the State Department had finally termed the
Salisbury agreement "illegal"' and unworkable on March 27,
1978. But as the months passed, an impasse developed in
the refusal of the newly formed Rhodesian Executive Council
to attend a all-party conference sponsored by the British
and Americans, and in the refusal of Britain and the U.S.
to lift economic sanctions against Rhodesia. While the
Western leaders held firmly to their commitment to convene
on all-party conference, the Executive Council was hard at
work attempting to soften up the Western stance on economic
sanctions. The visit of Bishop Muzorewa to Washington in
July of 1978 was undertaken to promote congressional and
popular support to this end. His visit prompted an OAU
warning to the U.S. not to violate the U.N. sanctions in
effect against Rhodesia. On July 26, 1978, the Senate,
nevertheless, voted (59 to 36) to lift those sanctions if
progress should be made in Rhodesia toward a freely elected
government willing to enter into negotiations with the
Patriotic Front. Interestingly, on the same day the State
Department had refused Muzorewa 's request to lift the
sanctions after he had again rejected proposals for an
all-party conference. Through the remainder of 1978 and
into 1979 the impasse continued, as the Rhodesian Executive
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Council made preparations for the national elections set
originally for December of 1978, and subsequently delayed
until April of 1979. The continued efforts of Secretary
Vance and Foreign Secretary Owen to seek an all-party
conference, even as late as a March 17 call for such talks
prior to the April elections, were rejected by
139Salisbury.
The British and American Plan and the diplomatic
efforts to effect it had aimed throughout this period at
more than a simple political arrangement for bringing about
black majority rule. Indeed that was the major objection
with the internal settlement. Rather, the aim was to bring
all the contending parties together in yet another effort
to work out the provisions for a transition phase and an
internationally approved settlement based on free
elections. At the same time, some modification of the
constitution was required to eliminate the entrenched
privileges for whites provided for in the "internal
settlement." Throughout the effort, the U.S. and Britain
had taken great pains not to choose one side or the other
and to sustain the credibility of the "neutral solution"
140
they had worked out. Still, the principal bartering
tools for wringing concessions from Ian Smith and his new
"internal settlement" had been first, to withhold
recognition of the legitimacy of his regime and second, to
support that action through economic sanctions. Thus, when
U.S. congressional initiatives regarding the lifting of
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economic sanctions arose in mid-1978, they posed the
considerable threat of undermining not just one of the
pillars of U.S. -British strength, but the entire process as
well. As such, the initiatives were among the first
visible signs of serious domestic opposition to the Carter
Administration's southern Africa policy. The Case-Javits
amendment to the International Securities Act of 1978
(September 26, 1978) mandated "a unilateral lifting of
sanctions against Rhodesia upon a Presidential
determination that two conditions had been met: (1) a
finding that the government of Rhodesia had demonstrated
its willingness to negotiate in good faith at an
all-parties conference on all relevent issues; and (2) a
finding that a government had been installed chosen by free
elections in which all political parties and population
groups had been allowed to participate freely with
observation by impartial, internationally recognized
observers." '•'^'
The degree to which differences existed between the
executive and legislative branches in their perceptions of
the nature of the problem and how to solve it was brought
to light in the wake of the Rhodesian elections in April,
1979. On May 15, 1979 the Senate adopted a nonbinding
"sense of Congress" resolution urging the President to lift
sanctions against Rhodesia within two weeks of the time
142that the new government would be installed in Salisbury.
On June 7, however, the President, acting in compliance
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with his obligations under the Case-Javits amendment,-
announced that he had decided not to lift sanctions since
the Rhodesian election had failed to adequately satisfy the
amendment's provisions. On June 12, the Senate responded
to the President's decision by voting 52-41 in favor of a
second Byrd Amendment (this time to the defense
authorization bill for 1980) calling for immediate lifting
of sanctions. On June 28, the situation was salvaged by the
U.S. House, however, which voted in favor of a bill
introduced by Representative Steve Solarz (D-NY) which
required a "termination of sanctions against Rhodesia by
October 15, 1979 unless the President determined that it
would not be in the national interest to do so."
Although in a subsequent vote on July 10, the House elected
to leave the issue of sanctions to the President, a
House-Senate conference on July 30, approved another Javits
compromise proposal which required the President to lift
sanctions by November 15, 1979 unless such an action was
144
not in the national interest.
While the congress attempted to assert its influence on
the course of U.S. decision-making over Rhodesia in its
post-election predicament, developments were underway for
reasserting a new effort at a negotiated settlement. The
British elections had brought the Conservative Party into
power with a new Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher. On May
23, Secretary Vance had met with Lord Carrington, the new
British Foreign Secretary, and among their discussions had
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been a mapping of the new approach to take toward Rhodesia.
On August 3, 1979, Mrs. Thatcher announced the outline of
new proposals calling for a new constitution, a cease-fire,-
145
and British-supervised elections. On the heels of a
Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka during the first week of
August where agreement was reached regarding the new
initiative, each of the parties to the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia
problem agreed to take part in the newly scheduled talks
146
set for London in early September.
The London Conference was initiated on September 10,
1979 by Lord Carrington who deftly superivsed and
manuevered the opposing factions through the difficult
negotiations and subordinate agreements of the conference.
On December 5, 1979, the Patriotic Front agreed to the last
details of the plan, effectively achieving a consensus by
all the parties on proposals for the transition phase,
election phase, and the constitutional provisions under
which they would be carried out.
The extraordinary success of the London accord brought
a number of associated developments to fruition very
quickly. On December 6, the U.S. Senate voted an end to
economic sanctions that was to go into effect on January
31, 1980 or upon the arrival of an interim British governor
in Salisbury. On December 11, the Rhodesian Assembly
repealed the 1965 UDI by a vote of 90-0, and set aside the
constitution framed under the internal settlement. With
the arrival of the British Governor, Lord Soames, in
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Salisbury on December 12, Britain ended its economic
sanctions; and on December 15, President Carter announced
that U.S. economic sanctions would be terminated on the
16th of December. On the 21st of December, the U.N.
Security Council voted to end its thirteen year embargo on
147Rhodesia as well, meaning that the real prospect for
both economic and political normalcy were clearly on the
horizon for early in 1980.
As David Ottaway, Africa correspondent for the
Washington Post
,
points out: "The London agreement
represented a tremendous diplomatic coup for Prime Minister
148
Thatcher and her Tory Party." He contends, however,
that the Carter Administration '" . . . played no direct role
in the breakthrough," though "in preventing the Muzorewa
government's supporters in Congress from forcing through
legislation lifting sanctions, ... it forestalled an
action which might well have torpedoed the London
149Conference." It is worthy of note that the President
steadfastly resisted the pressure to acquiesce to Congress,
and that he took definitive stands at critical junctures to
keep U.S. policy on the track toward its desired objective
of a comprehensive settlement, even though the
responsibility and direct role of the British overshadowed
the U.S.'s participation in the final arrangements for the
settlement. Indeed, one is compelled to note the
'fortuitous' timing of the U.S.'s reversion to a
subordinate and much less active role, at the very time
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when the British were assuming the more active, central,
and critical functions of mediator and coordinator in the
settlement process. This development marked the effective
re-emergence of one of the five pillar concepts from the
1960 's - to emphasis the special role of the former
colonial powers in the resolution of .African political
problems.
The emergence of congressional resistance to President
Carter's exercise of his policy prerogatives in southern
Africa certainly meant that the U.S. position, so carefully
and assiduously pursued over the first two and one half
years of his administration, had been considerably
weakened. Given this development, the administration's
capacity to take or maintain a flexible and assertive
leadership role had been considerably diminished. Though
the Carter foreign policy team that had worked so hard to
get the U.S. policy on the "right track'' with regard to
southern Africa would surely have relished playing the
central role in the final successful efforts of achieving a
Rhodesian settlement, the goals and objectives of their
policy efforts had been realized: an internationally
recognized settlement facilitating the viable political
prospect of democratic elections being held, with the black
majority and all the competing factions participating in
the electoral process.
There is no doubt that the settlement of the
Rhodesia-Zimbabwe problem must be considered the "success"
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of British foreign policy and particularly the result of
the brilliant efforts of Lord Carrington. Nevertheless,
there is the sense in which the supportive efforts of the
U.S. and the constructive role it had designed for itself
must be considered a success for the Carter Administration
as well. Clearly, while its role in the final negotiations
was very limited, the objective of U.S. policy in regard to
Zimbabwe had been successfully attained. Paradoxically,
this qualified success of the Carter Administration's
foreign policy in southern Africa, the product of phase one
priorities and world view, occurred at a time when the
administration was undergoing the change, or indeed had
made the change, to the priorities, redefined world view,
and subsequent policy changes of phase two. Perhaps the
experience of seeing the cherished expectations and hard
work of a southern Africa policy almost dashed by the
counter-pressure of a domestic power base, and especially
the Congress, was an occasion for re-evaluating some of the
more optimistic notions about the relationship of the
domestic factor to foreign policy goals and modes of
operation.
What had clearly become a source of Administration
concern, however, was the domestic perception that the
U.S. was allowing the Soviets to get the upper hand in more
locations and on more opportunities than was acceptable.
As the national political mood moved further toward the
right with each apparent setback to the U.S.
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internationally, the Administration found itself lagging
behind repititively - caught in the throes of two forms of
reaction: One, reacting to the turbulent charges occurring
outside the country, and two, reacting to the gap between
its relative equanimity toward those outside events and the
more conservative stances of the public, congress, and the
majority of bureaucracies. By mid-1979, the disturbing
question of "who was leading whom?" was becoming more and
more relevent both inside government and outside of it.
The accumulation of three years of mini-crises,
deterioration of relations with the Soviets, and chronic
domestic problems with which to try to deal had established
the 'reality' preconditions for a change in administration
outlook; political polls had preconditioned the need for a
change in leadership style; an upcoming election had
preconditioned the necessity for attuning policy and style
to the perceived expectations of the political
constituency; and the crises in Iran and Afghanistan
triggered the reflex to undertake changes immediately
rather than later. Thus by January of 1980, the need had
become particularly clear that the administration, perhaps
against its better intellectual judgement, had to make some
definitive changes within its outlook, its policy, and
especially the substance of its leadership role in the
United States.
There were many domestic and international problems for
the Administration to contend with and numerous
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modifications that could be incorporated to facilitate
improving its image. Yet, no problem area seemed as
critical, substantively and symbolically, as the
deterioration of U.S. -Soviet relations virtually all across
the board. Thus, a face-lift of policy and a reorientation
of priorities toward the Soviets could achieve a high
degree of spontaneous and genuine favor in domestic
political suppport. Given the real and perceived nature of
its problems with the Soviets, the Administration evoked
the historically conditioned reflex of 'getting tough with
the Russians' which must have seemed not only a suitable
domestic political expedient, but an international
necessity as well.
The problem, however, remained in the short run what it
had always been — how to deal with the Soviets and with
the "relationship" of the U.S. and the USSR, not only on
its own terms, but in terms of its potentially disruptive
and catalytic influence on the course of events in the
international arena.
D. THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND RELATIONS WITH THE
SOVIETS
With regard to an overall assessment of the strengths
and weaknesses of the Carter Administration in foreign
policy, it appears that the perspectives, instincts and
philosophical underpinnings of the policy were essentially
well founded, particularly in regard to the Third World.
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The major difficulty of the administration's foreign policy
centered on the U.S. approach toward the Soviet Union both
in phase one and in phase two. The approach in phase one
for dealing with the Soviets, which was to have been a
sophisticated blend of competition and cooperation, in
fact, may not have been well thought through. It seemed
to exhibit a certain philosophical weakness, but more
important, seemed inattentive to the task of employing a
full array of political and economic measures to effect
desireable results in the competitive - cooperative
relationship. What contributed to this development and to
the subsequent problems that have developed in the
U.S. -Soviet relationship?
In a world of complex, diverse demands engendered by
substantial political, economic and social heterogeneity,
strategic parity had presented an opportunity for the U.S.
to neutralize and perhaps even defuse the military and
strategic nuclear elements of U.S. -Soviet competition, a
competition in which the Soviets had demonstrated certain
structural and psychological advantages. By
neutralizing the relative importance of that continued
competition, the U.S. had established a favorable
precondition from which to exert an "especially advantaged"
competitive edge over the Soviets in dealing with the rest
of the world. This effort, first conceptualized and
capitalized upon by Nixon and Kissinger, was carried
forward under Ford and continued in modified form, under
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Carter. The critical variables in the concept were the
maintenance of a relative balance in military posture and
neutralization of the expansionist proclivities of the
Soviet Union through a new and more subtle form of
containment. This took the form of the carrot and stick
techniques of "cooperation" which (from the U.S. view) was
designed to encourage Soviet restraint in exchange for such
U.S. concessions as trade and technology transfer, and
agreements to undertake negotiations on arms control and
disarmament. The concept of a cooperative/competitive
relationship was premised on the general notion that the US
could help bring the Soviets along toward maturity as a
respectable super power and responsible member in a stable
world order by developing a relationship in which the
actions of each would be governed by mutual restraint,
responsibility, and negotiation. The relationship would be
reinforced by "linkages" to economic relations and cultural
interchange. Thus, Soviet behavior could be moderated
through the discipline imposed by external contacts and
the desire to assure the continued exchange of economic and
technological benefits.
Under Nixon and Ford these notions were operationalized
under a bipolar conception of a world wherein U.S. -Soviet
relations functioned as the predominant measure of and
means for maintaining and assuring international order. The
bipolar relationship received maximum attention as the
central construct of international perceptions. However,
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these notions of structure in the relationship were
vulnerable to collapsing under a foreign policy
establishment that might deliberately play down the bipolar
relationship, and in the process fail to exert the
continued, sufficient, and if necessary, progressive
pressure to restrain the Soviet leadership's proclivity for
expansion. In phase one, the Carter Administration,
preoccupied with world order priorities and concerns,
tended to downplay the prospect of Soviet expansionism and
the presumably limited benefits to accrue to the Soviet
Union out of such behavior. Moreover, the administration
seems clearly to have held out high expectations for the
utility that cooperation, mutual interest/ and restraint
could afford as effective and essentially passive means
through which potential Soviet expansionism could be kept
in check. Lack of realistic political measures, high
expectations, and miscalculation, then, tended to opt
against keeping or inducing the Soviets to exhibit the sort
of responsibility and self-restraint the U.S. would like
to have seen.
This unfolding reality of a deterioration in
U.S. -Soviet relations was evident to the administration by
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as early as September 1978. Having recognized this
fact, perhaps the most glaring weakness of the Carter
Administration in demonstrating effective measures toward
anaging U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and in coming




roles of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the
international community has been the failure in effective
communications. Not only had the successive
administrations of Ford and Carter demonstrated an
inability to communicate with the Soviets effectively, but
these administrations (and especially Carter's) seem to
have been woefully ineffective in communicating to the
American public a realistic image of the Soviet Union. The
image of the Soviets in recent years has been influenced
more by the press and the conservatives than by
administration spokesmen. In effect, this fact has worked
to the disadvantage both of the Carter world order set of
priorities and of the effectiveness of its overall foreign
policy.
Perceptions of the Soviet Union vary widely. For the
Carter Administration, the image of the Soviets, implicit
in the de-emphasis of the bipolar conceptions of U.S. vs.
Soviet competition, is the notion of the Soviet Union as a
viable military power, but as an essentially impoverished
and ineffectve economic empire, deserving of little more
than second-rate super power status. A second image, more
widely held in conservative perceptions, is the view of
the Soviet Union as an expansionist empire. In a world of
chaos and disorder, the Soviet Union, as a relatively
viable superpower, is going to exert its force and
influence to obtain results (in its sphere of influence and
outside its sphere) favorable to its interests. A third
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view of the Soviet Union reflects its present status and
the outline of what appears to be the Soviet Union of the
near future. That is the view of the Soviet Union,
regardless of its idiosyncratic manner or psychology, as a
viable super power, limited in its ability to exercise a
full range of long term assistance, aid, and
political-economic development, but with the real and
increasingly flexible capability to exert its power and
will forceably in regions of the world remote to its
heretofore circumscribed sphere of influence. This is the
view of a Soviet Union, confident and proud of its
accomplishments, with a certain ideological zeal to forge
its way of life and beliefs on receptive brethren in a
conflict ridden world. This is the view of a nation and a
way of life whose orthodoxy is taken for granted and whose
behavior is viewed as self-righteous and self-justifying
(in much the same way as in the U.S.) and which feels in
these twin self perceptions that it has not only the right,
but also the historical obligation, to promulgate its
influence on a world victimized for too long by the
injustices of the capitalist economic order.
In short, we delude our selves in such
sophomoric-notions as conceiving that we alone can contain
Soviet power and expansion by carrot and stick techniques.
Nor, however, do we do justice to our best interests by
suggesting that each overture of Soviet expansionism be
countered by the sabre-rattling of increased defense
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expenditures or movement of troops and equipment to remote
locations on the globe to counter the real or perceived
Soviet threat. Rather, what we desperately need is a broad
strategic and tactical understanding (a consensus perhaps
short of a doctrine or an all-encompassing format
represented by a single concept like ''containment") around
which to organize our military, political, economic, and
social resources for dealing with the Soviets and the
threat they actually present to us - the threat that a
society and nation, less humane, less well organized, less
concerned with the human verities should stimulate in us
the fool, to be outmanuevered and outclassed because of our
own insecurities and inability to see the contest at stake
for what it is. There is a battle, there is a contest,-
there is a threat; but we are part of and deeply involved
in a large-scale ongoing process - the exercise of power
and influence by the two most powerful nation-states on
Earth. Given the power the U.S. and the USSR already
possess and the potential for the long run to increase
qualitatively and quantitatively in the accumulation of
even more power, there is every reason to expect that our
battle will be protacted, uneven in relative successes or
failures for both of us, and unlikely to succumb to a
facile, one-sided victory without the horror of an all-out
military engagement. Patience and determination to be firm
but flexible in our assessment of the battle and in our
actions seem to be virtually mandatory. Furthermore,
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given the long-term nature of the contest, the
extraordinary complexity of international problems, and the
inevitability of mistakes, setbacks, recoveries, lucky
breaks, and real successes, there is no reason to gauge the
contest in the short term as a zero-sum game where one's
gain is the other's loss and vice versa.
Thus, if we as a nation do not come to perceive the
competition with the Soviet Union in some mutually
agreeable fashion (even allowing for substantive
differences on many issues), and do not fashion for
ourselves some broad form of consensus as to the nature of
the competition, what it means in terms of a protracted
commitment, and our stake in it, we face the prospect of
frenetic anxiety and insecurity over a contest we tend to
view too narrowly and with too much alarm. It is just this
sort of lack of understanding and inordinate fear that pose
the most dangerous prospect that we may unwittingly propel
ourselves, as the Soviets so deeply fear, into a military
confrontation that might otherwise be avoidable if we think
and act with greater self-assurance and understanding.
Moreover, self-assurance and understanding would go far to
promote our ability to carefully define and firmly defend
those interests at home and abroad which we consider to be
vital, as well as those other interests we are willing to
make commitments to protect, nurture, and sustain. At the
same time our flexibility would be materially advanced in
our awareness that the contest can be tailored by our wise
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identification and selection of the measures we want to use
to effect our influence and protect our interests, with the
final reservation to defend them (or even to go on the
military offensive) to ensure their survival and perhaps





The conclusions one can draw from an analysis of the
U.S. foreign policy toward a sub-regional problem area such
as southern Africa are subject to reflect one's starting
point and frame of reference, and also certain limitations
of relevance to overall U.S. foreign policy problems. It
seems abundantly clear that such a limited scope of
analysis, no matter how thorough-going, is only able to
explore a certain dimension of the problem. The full
diversity of the southern Africa problem and the relative
significance of the U.S. foreign policy aspect of that
problem are only explicable within a framework that devotes
equal attention to the other primary aspects of the
problem: i.e., Soviet foreign policy and involvement, and
the nature of the regional dimension of the problem in all
its diversity. Yet, given the limits in scope of the
analysis presented here, which has concentrated on the
political and philosophical objectives of U.S. policy
formation and implementation, there are a number of
conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis which in
addition to their own intrinsic merit, may have relevance
as indicators of things to come in the foreign policy
approach of the U.S. toward the region.
The central objective of this thesis has been to
identify the goals and substance of the U.S.'s political
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interests in its foreign policy toward southern Africa.
The effort has illuminated the fact that there are elements
of essential continuity in the U.S.'s multiple interests in
Africa and in the foreign policy pronouncements of
successive administrations. The key element seems clearly
to have been a U.S. interest in promoting (both in word and
action) a political reality in Africa that should be free
of outside interference (military intervention) by
communist states and particularly the Soviet Union. From
the first element and its essentially negative aspect
flowed the second and third elements of continuity. The
second being that the unique problems of African
nation-building and modernization along with the
institution of viable and legitimate political organization
and structure were problems that lent themselves to being
solved almost exclusively by Africans themselves. Thirdly,
whatever coordination, problem-solving, and assistance
might be required should be provided in the main by the
former colonial powers of Western Europe. The fourth
element centered on the generalized interest of the U.S. to
witness the economic development of the continent both on
its own term.s for the positive effect it would bring to the
development of African society generally, and for the
prospect that the continent could enter more fully into the
world economic system. In this regard, Africa was viewed
as a valuable source of raw materials, products, and goods
and as a huge potential market for the finished products
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and goods of Western industrialized society. The fifth
element, at least through 1975, was to limit the sale and
transfer of military hardware and technology to African
states.
While U.S. policy has demonstrated continuity in the
above elements, there have been significant changes in the
nature and intensity of the U.S.'s political interests and
perspectives toward southern Africa. The benign neglect
that characterized the Eisenhower years gave way to the
increased idealism, hopes, and policy pronouncements of
the Kennedy and the early Johnson years. By 1965, the
policy of the "five pillars" represented a rounded U.S.
foreign policy approach toward Africa, though its
importance diminished substantially in the late 60's, due
primarily to U.S. preoccupations in Southeast Asia. This
situation was the legacy to Nixon and Kissinger, who in
their new era" thinking had relegated southern Africa and
the continent as a whole to a rather low priority among the
foreign policy concerns of the U.S. Furthermore, there is
evidence which indicates that under the Nixon
Administration, the U.S. viewed the nature of the growing
black African independence and black majority rule problems
of southern Africa as primarily racial and not political.
Therefore, the U.S. approach to southern Africa was to deal
with it through "contact," persuasion, and negotiation with
the white populace and governments in the region, in the
hope of inducing gradual social evolution rather than
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political resolution. Thus, inattentiveness and misreading
the local dimensions and intensity of the problem were
added to the dominant predilection to view the region as a
sub-element in the bipolar relations of the U.S. and Soviet
Union. These were the characteristics which marked the
broad outline and mentality of the Nixon-Ford perspective
and their foreign policy approach toward the region into
1975.
The Angolan Crisis marked a true watershed in U.S.
relations with southern Africa. Soviet and Cuban support
to the MPLA was perceived by the Executive Branch as a
direct threat to the basic elements of U.S. policy in
Africa and as a general threat to the power and prestige of
the U.S. The legislature^ deeply suspicious and cautious
of another Vietnam-like entanglement in a Third World
country, perceived the U.S. interest very differently, and
blocked Executive proposals to increase U.S. support to the
FNLA and UNITA. It was out of this twin domestic and
international crisis that Dr. Kissinger and his assistants
fashioned the remarkable reorientation of U.S. policy
toward southern Africa presented at Lusaka in April 1976.
The new policy was a bold and well-conceived U.S.
counter-stroke to Soviet adventurism in the region and had
been designed, after all, as a means to offset the Soviet's
military presence in the region. But the policy was also
intended to demonstrate a new U.S. interest in seeing the
political problems in the region solved by non-violent
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means and under a stepped up and more urgent agenda.
The Carter Administration has continued and even
intensified that U.S. commitment, operating in phase one
from a significantly different global perspective than did
Kissinger. While continuities in the basic elements of
U.S. policy have remained essentially intact, the intensity
of the Carter Administration's foreign policy efforts in
southern Africa can be viewed as a reflection of its phase
one dedication to the regionalist approach to geopolitical
problems. During phase one, the Carter Administration
perceived the U.S. interest in southern Africa and the
region's problems to be predominantly political. As a
result, U.S. policy was directed toward the task of solving
the regional and internal aspects of a "political
problem". In the Administration's view, such an approach
would provide the best means of pursuing or maintaining
other U.S. interests including countering Soviet activities
in the region. This outlook provided the motivating factor
to U.S. support of the British initiatives and negotiations
which in late 1979 and in early 1980, finally resulted in a
settlement of the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe problem.
In the first half of 1980, however, there is evidence
of a subtle, but perceptible change taking place within the
Administration concerning its perspectives and policy
toward the region. Perhaps it is because of the progress
already made in southern Africa or more probably because of




interests in the so called 'arc of instability", but, a
shift of foreign policy emphasis seems clearly to be
underway in which southern Africa concerns are simply no
longer the sort of top priority matters they once were.
While southern Africa could not possibly remain a top
priority of U.S. foreign policy indef initley , there is
danger of allowing a certain inattentiveness to deteriorate
to the former conditions of apathy or neglect. Such a
development in combination with the reemergence of a U.S.
bipolar perspective oriented on a perceived Soviet threat
could easily reconstitute the conditions and the sort of
political vacuum in southern Africa which existed prior to
the Angolan Crisis of 1975.
The central undertaking of identifying the goals and
substance of U.S. policy toward southern Africa has
illuminated a number of characteristics in the domestic and
international environment which possess a direct relevance
to the nature and conduct of U.S. foreign policy. The
fundamental characteristic is change. It is persistent,
dynamic, and frequently turbulent. A second fundamental
characteristic is the extraordinary diversity of domestic
and international realities, which are marked by the
increasing importance of the Third world political,
economic, and social demands for redistribution of the
world's wealth and for increased political participation in
the decisions affecting the international order. Change,
diversity, and increasing demands on the international
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system interrelate to produce an arena of complex
heterogeneous, competing interests. The nature of the
environment and the sort of relationships and pursuits that
characterize it are subject to widely different individual
and national "perceptions". In the U.S., perceptions tend
to function in a constant state of flux as the polity
attempts to estimate what is "real" and "ideal" in the
foreign affairs of this nation. The tension of these
shifting estimates in an essentially dualistic political
system may account for the pendulum-like changes in
domestic perceptions and the influence such changes exert
on the course of U.S. foreign policy.
In the course of this historical and analytical
examination of U.S. foreign policy toward southern Africa,
a number of important underlying features and
characteristics have received special consideration for the
part they play in the formulation and implementation of
U.S. foreign policy, and a number of observations have been
made about the complex process involved in the making of
that policy. This analysis has focussed considerable
attention on perceptions and philosophical outlook. They
are critical ingredients in evaluating and establishing the
foreign policy goals, interests, and priorities of the U.S.
and frequently manifest themselves in the exercise of
national power and influence through foreign policy. The
analysis has highlighted the abiding interrelationship of
domestic and international affairs and the synergistic
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effect the two elements have on the nature of bilateral and
multilateral relations. In part, the analysis has been
concerned with the nature of power / not so much in its
positive or mechanical aspects, but perhaps more
significantly, in the ways in which it is subtly limited by
philosophical outlook, by pluralistic constraints, by
superpower rivalry and fear, and by mutual or self-imposed
restraints. Implicitly, it has suggested the considerable
degree to which limits exist on the power and influence of
the U.S. (and the Soviet Union as well).
The analysis has addressed the central role the Soviets
have played and continue to play in the regional and
geopolitical interests of the U.S., and in the abiding
influence the Soviets have exerted in prompting alterations
and redirections in U.S. policy in southern Africa. Thus,
for example, the Soviet role in Angola can be singled out
as the most critical stimulus to the new U.S. policy toward
southern Africa which emerged under Kissinger's direction
in 1976. The analysis has also referred frequently to the
general nature of U.S-Soviet relations, to the changing
nature of U.S. perceptions of and policy toward the
Soviets, and to the frequent disappointments and
frustrations experienced by the U.S. with the
competitive-cooperative relationship.
Given the importance of the Soviet influence on U.S.
policies and international perspectives, the analysis has
explored the underpinnings, thrust, and relative merit of
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the regionalist versus the globalist perspective in the
conduct of U.S. foreign policy. The two approaches are not
mutually exclusive. The relative successes of the
regionalist approach in southern Africa, however, must be
weighed against the need to be highly attentive to other
global concerns of the U.S. and to the special importance
of the bipolar relationship of the U.S. and Soviet Union.
The important thing to consider is the relative advantage
that can be capitalized upon in the regional approach when
it is selectively applied to given foreign policy problem
areas. Given the complexities of the international arena
and its diverse problems, the availability of both
approaches presents a clear opportunity to adapt U.S.
responses to different situations and to have flexible
options for supporting what Mr. Brzezinski has termed a
"complex foreign policy" . '^'*
The analysis has also explored the near-term prospect
of an emerging crisis threshold in U.S. foreign policy
generally, and in southern Africa specifically. The main
feature of this development is related to the last point
concerning the merits and utility of the
regionalist-globalist approach in U.S. foreign policy. By
early 1980, a number of factors had combined to produce the
major changes of phase two in the Carter Administration,
including the deterioration of U.S. -Soviet relations, the
Iranian hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
increased perceived threats to the stability of the Persian
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Gulf region, and the entire complex of these events being
subjected to the turmoil and rhetoric of an American
presidential election year. The main feature of phase two
has been the reappearance of the bipolar perspective in
U.S. geopolitical thinking, attended by a considerably more
right- leaning attitude and hard line within the
administration in its dealings with the Soviets. The
outline of these changes and its implications for
subordinate foreign policy problems is not yet clear, and
indeed, given the ambivalence and transition of the
dominant foreign policy approach from regionalism to a
bipolar globalism, there is currently a perceptible void in
U.S. policy regarding the concepts and coordinating
direction of its southern Africa policy. While the
prospect of continued conflict and hostility in southern
Africa remains very real, the current status of U.S. policy
toward the region is marked by an apparent withdrawal,
caused in part by the uncertainties of an overall U.S.
foreign policy in apparent drift.
Finally, it seems important to sum up the dominant
thrust of this analysis which has been to deal with the
extraordinary complexity of both the foreign policy of the
U.S. and of the many international problems with which it
has to deal. In exploring the nuances of complexity of
these interrelated factors, the analysis has attempted to
suggest implicitly what Colin Legum made explicit at a
conference at the Naval Postgraduate School in July of
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1979: "[We in the West] . . . have to accept and learn to
live with the dilemma of conflicting interests and
pluralism, and the uncertainties of what that implies. "^^^
Mr. Legum's comments are at once an exhortation to the U.S.
to refine its perspectives and foreign policy outlook and a
plea to avoid the reductionism of simple answers and policy
responses in a complex world, both of which are premises
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